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Executive Summary 
The problem 
Climate change presents the global community with what has been called an “unstruc-
tured” problem, that is, a large scale, highly complex problem containing many uncer-
tainties and cross-cutting issues. Science can only make educated guesses as to what the 
effects of the problem will be and there is little agreement among and within countries as 
to how, and to what extent, climate change should be addressed. It is especially difficult 
to reach negotiated solutions to such problems, partly because of the shear range of is-
sues and unknowns involved, but also because difficult to assess and little discussed 
value questions are prominent. Thus, while science may be able to offer its “best guess” 
scenarios as to what the effects of climate change will be, this in itself is insufficient be-
cause it does not answer questions such as: To what extent are people willing to accept a 
changed environment? What are the sacrifices and trade-offs that are acceptable in deal-
ing with the climate change problem? Yet it is these types of questions that form the ba-
sis of any negotiation in the area of climate change. Furthermore, while science cannot 
answer these questions, the formal negotiation process simply does not discuss broad 
value issues. The pressures and structure of the formal negotiation setting tends to focus 
negotiators on problems that are readily solvable or easy to debate.  The result is that 
only short-term issues and details are discussed while the wider context and conse-
quences of climate change are forgotten This is evident in the fact that negotiations have 
largely avoided Article 2 of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) 
which states the long-term objectives of the climate change regime.   
This project addressed Phase 1 of a three-phase programme entitled: ’Helping Opera-
tiona lise article Two (HOT): A science-based policy dialogue on fair and effective ways 
to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system and implications for Post-Kyoto 
policies’. The aim of this programme is to elaborate on Article 2 of the Climate Change 
Convention (FCCC), which provides the long-term objective of the climate change re-
gime. This is seen as an important step towards ensuring that the consecutive short-term 
steps adopted in the regime meet the long-term objective.  
Article 2 is not an issue that can be addressed by scientists alone, and calls for a science-
based policy dialogue. A dialogue is a time consuming process and to ensure that it is 
successful it is vital that the participants are committed to the process in terms of the is-
sues involved, the time they are willing to spend on the project and the need to engage 
seriously in a dialogue as opposed to a monologue or negotiation. This calls for an inten-
sive investment in the conditions that guarantee that such a project will be successful. 
Hence, the first phase of this project is essentially the preparatory phase which aims at 
putting in place the conditions that will ensure the international multicultural dialogue to 
be engaged in Phase 2 is effective.  
The second phase is the continuation of the dialogue process at regional and global le v-
els aimed at producing a document that articulates and elaborates on the different inter-
pretations of Article 2 and the reasoning that justifies these interpretations. This is de-
picted in the following figure. 
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Figure 1 The interactional set of dialogues in the HOT Programme 
The project was implemented by six institutes spread throughout the world. These in-
cluded the Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) in Amsterdam, the National Insti-
tute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) in the Netherlands, The Energy and 
Resources Institute (TERI) in Delhi, ENDA-Tiers Monde in Dakar, the Tyndall Centre 
for Climate Research in the UK, and COPPE/Climate Centre in Brazil. 
Phase 1of this programme, the preparatory phase, was aimed at investigating whether the 
conditions are ripe for engaging in an international multicultural dialogue. Is there sup-
port for conducting an experiment on an interacting series of dialogues as a means to ad-
dress complex global problems? Phase 1 focused on the inventorisation and preliminary 
discussion of these issues at national and/or regional level, as well as some initial ex-
perimentation with the rules of procedure for developing such a dialogue. 
The research question for Phase 1 was: Given the vast differences in the national inter-
ests of countries, how can a common basis be developed for the further articulation of 
Article 2 of the FCCC?  
Four national and / or regional dialogues were carried out in Asia, Africa, Latin America 
and Annex I countries. The purpose of the dialogues was not to change the participants’ 
negotiating positions however. Dialogue success rather, was defined as a situation in 
which participants from different groups listened openly to each other, felt that they were 
truly listened to, were fully involved in the discussion, and were given a chance to reflect 
on their own position without compromising their core values.  The point is that the dia-
logues are not related to political negotiations. The overall aim of the exercise was to in-
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crease understanding and explore new areas of agreement by providing a neutral and 
open environment – not to directly impact the ongoing climate negotiations. 
Prior to the dialogues, questionnaires were distributed in different parts of the world to 
guage the responses of the stakeholders. The Brazilian project team sent out 700 ques-
tionnaires but received only 13 answers. The Asian survey was sent to 200 stakeholders 
and 27 responses were elicited. 14 responses were from South Asia, 10 from South-East 
Asia, 2 from the former Soviet Union countries and 1 from West Asia. Classified in 
terms of stakeholders, 6 responses were received from government, 8 from scientists, 10 
from NGOs, 2 from international organizations and 1 from business. The African survey 
was sent to about 100 respondents and 20 responses were received, most of which were 
from NGOs and research centres and 8 from policy makers and negotiators, some from 
IPCC scientists. In terms of geographical representation half of the responses were from 
West Africa. The Annex I questionnaire was sent to 300 stakeholders of whom 38 re-
sponded. The responses were mostly from scientists (17), policymakers (15), NGOs (5) 
and business (1). Most responses came from Europe (19), America (8), other OECD (7), 
Central Europe (1) and International Organisations (3). However, there was a relatively 
low response to these questionnaires.  
When consulted, they explained that they only respond when they are somehow stimu-
lated by the subject and feel that their opinion counts. However, it appears that in many 
of the regions people were afraid to respond because they did not have a good under-
standing of the climate change issues and had actually never given much thought to Arti-
cle 2, even though they were engaged in the climate change discussions in one way or 
another. A request to simplify the questionnaire as a means to gauge responses was 
made.  
Four workshops were held in different parts of the world as shown in the table be low. 
 TERI ENDA COPPE OECD 
Date regional 
meeting 
30 June, 1 July. 27 – 28 June 14 May 2-3 June 
Venue regional 
meeting 
Bangalore  Accra Rio de Janeiro Amsterdam 
Procedural chair Kok Kee Chow 
(Malaysia) or 
Shekhar Das-
gupta (India) 
Dr. Papa Cham 
(Gambia) and 
Dr. Peter Yerima 
Tarfa (Nigeria) 
Dr. Fabio 
Feldmann 
Dr. Joyeeta 
Gupta 
Substantive chair Mohan Mun-
asinghe (Sri 
Lanka) or Tsu-
neyuki Morita 
(Japan) 
Jean Philipe 
Thomas  
Dr. Fabio 
Feldmann (with 
technical support 
COPPE) 
Dr. Bert Metz 
Logistical coor-
dinator 
Poonam Sahai 
and Tanushree 
Sinha 
Djimingue 
Nanasta 
André Simões 
and Carolina 
Dubeux 
Marcel Berk en 
Wietske van den 
Bovenkamp 
 
At the dialogues themselves, it also became increasingly apparent that most of the par-
ticipants neither had a clear-cut position on Article 2 based on reasoned arguments, de-
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tailed estimates of indicators, nor perceptions of threshold values.  Instead they were still 
at the stage of calling for more information in order to be able to make an informed pos i-
tion. Although we initially did intend to cluster the different views, we discovered that in 
most cases it made more sense to inventorize the informational needs emerging from the 
different perspectives. It is anticipated that dealing with these informational needs will 
help to provide a common starting point for developing different positions.  
Major conclusions 
At the end of the first phase of the HOT project, the project team concluded that they 
were satisfied with the outcomes of the first phase. Most participants in the process be-
came very stimulated by the complicated scientific and value dimension of Article 2 and 
the need to develop new instruments for communication at a global level on these com-
plex issues. Some of the key conclusions of the first phase are:  
The focus on Article 2 
There was general consensus on the need to focus on Article 2. It was agreed that politi-
cal agreement was possible in 1992 by keeping Article 2 unclear and open to interpreta-
tion; but any future steps will need a further articulation of this Article . This leads to the 
implication that any attempt at articulating Article 2 will be an extremely politically 
cha llenging task and that high quality regional preparation and global dialogue as a pre-
condition for negotiation are a must.  
Is climate change a serious problem? 
In all the developing country workshops, there appeared to be some doubts as to the se-
verity of the potential impacts of climate change for the worlds’developing countries and 
there was a strong request for scientific studies that would he lp predict the magnitude of 
the impact and its consequences. This was somewhat in sharp contrast with the Annex I 
workshop where there was little doubt that developing countries would be very hard hit.  
The developed country questionnaires revealed that ma ny felt that we were already ex-
periencing dangerous climate change. The impacts on developing countries were seen to 
be primarily in relation to small island countries and possibly desert regions, but the im-
plications for the hydrological systems worldwide appeared to be underestimated. 
Can environment and development be dichotomised? 
Many stakeholders in the developing countries feel that these countries should focus on 
development and the environmental issues are of lesser importance. Besides, given the 
current status of the problem, the magnitude of the costs to reduce the concentration of 
GHG in the atmosphere to a safe level and the political difficulties to implement the re-
quired measures, there will be need to count on technology in order to minimize the 
problem. The argument was that new technologies will substitute for some the functions 
of the environment. This leads to the question: Can developing countries afford to di-
chotomise ecosystem protection and development in the context of Article 2? Further, 
can new technologies actually imply a reduced dependence on the environment? How 
can climate change be mainstreamed? 
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The adequacy of Article 2 
The discussions concluded that Article 2 needed to be further elaborated so that there is 
common understanding of: 
· What is not an acceptable outcome of Article 2; 
· When Article 2 conditions are no longer met; 
· Common starting points for discussion and elaboration on the key terms in the Arti-
cle and the appropriate scale for these terms; 
· Identifying information needs to help the articulation process. 
Naming the Controversies 
There was some divergence about how serious climate change is as a problem, how 
“dangerous” should be defined, how priorities should be set, the risk of reductionist in-
terpretations of Article 2 and that the fear that historic responsibilities would not be 
taken into account.  
There was also fear about the monetization of social and cultural aspects and the exces-
sive use of economic instruments.  
There were concerns that the way ecosystems were included it was unclear if all ecosys-
tems should be protected for themselves and whether the ecological services they pr o-
vide to humans was included. There was general consensus on, in any case, including the 
latter concept in the articulation of this concept. Maintaining all ecosystems may be a 
valuable goal but not feasible.  
The first step in dealing with the controversies is to name them and to see if we can de-
velop a common conceptual document in relation to these controversies and then move 
the dialogue further from there.  
Unacceptable outcomes 
The stakeholders indicated that three types of outcomes that are considered as unaccept-
able to the developing countries: 
· adverse environmental outcomes such as increase in famines, natural disasters, dis-
turbances to global/regional climate patterns, depopulation of small islands and the 
rise of environmental refugees and the relegation of adaptation as a secondary issue; 
· adverse policy outcomes for developing countries such as binding commitments that 
compromise the right to development, economically unfeasible implementation time 
frames, inequitable distribution of costs, inappropriate technology transfer, and other 
negative impacts on the domestic economy, etc. and  
· adverse policy outcomes for all countries whic h would allow unsustainable energy 
use, unplanned industrialization and fuel-wood consumption, excessively high per 
capita emissions, high carbon intensity of GDP. 
Finding common ground through local impacts 
The participants asked for information regarding how concentrations of GHGs affect 
ecosystems, how they impact on local human health and timber production, how they af-
fect desertification; what the roles of oceans, soils and deserts are as sinks of greenhouse 
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gases; how much of the emissions are human induced; the development of indices of lo-
cal and regional vulnerability and adaptive capacity, various response measures for ada p-
tation, methods to determine thresholds for risks, and approaches to assess risks in a ho-
listic manner. However, if it is possible to identify local systems that will be harmed in 
different types of countries both rich and poor at the same concentration level, this same 
analysis of local perspectives may generate common ground between countries. 
Finding common ground through the development of Indicators 
There was general consensus that developing indicators for what could be dangerous is  
a useful way forward. There was also a need to create a procedure for defining indic a-
tors.  Furthermore it was necessary at this stage to prioritise the indicators on the basis of 
a set of criteria. It was also considered useful to know what each concentration level 
would imply in terms of impacts at the global and regional level. 
Finding common ground through understanding the importance of values 
and principles in international law and relations 
The major question that was raised in all the dialogues was how mitigation and adapta-
tion costs should be distributed among countries and what criteria should be used to do 
this. Several criteria were mentioned in the different dialogues and number of principles 
were put forward. The legal viability of these norms needs to be verified through legal 
and political science research.  
Social and scientific learning 
Most of the participants in the developing country workshops had a very little notion of 
what a discussion of Article 2 would involve. Many felt intimidated by the questions in 
the questionnaire and were afraid that they did not have enough knowledge to deal with 
them. However, by the end of the workshops, most felt that even if they had not changed 
their position, they had learnt considerably about the various dimensions of Article 2. 
But even in the OECD workshops, partic ipants felt that they had been exposed to a rich 
learning experience.  
Self-selection of participants 
In all the regional workshops it has become more than apparent that some kinds of 
stakeholders are more willing to participate than others. Very few participants from 
business and industry responded positively to the invitations to participate. This indicates 
that either they do not see the determination of long-term goals as something they have 
any competence in, or simply because of lack of interest. This also implied that only 
those who were either very interested or motivated in the issue participated. The question 
is: Is it a structural weakness of the approach that the groups turn out to be groups of 
like-minded people? On the other hand, there were enough differences of opinion in all 
the workshops to still make it worthwhile to continue the discussions. Yet, this is a struc-
tural weakness and the partners will have to devise ways to include uninterested stake-
holders with large stakes to join the process on the basis of the idea that “you have to 
start somewhere”.  The dialogue will hopefully provide ideas and learning that, eventu-
ally, will influence the many parties who are not interested or are perhaps even hostile to 
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climate change negotiations.  This in itself is a good justification to continue the dialogue 
cycle further since the more chance people have to gain and share information, the more 
likely it is that ideas will sink in and extend to a wider circle.   
Recommendations 
The major recommendations that flow out of this research are: 
Continuation of the dialogues 
There was general consensus on the need for national and regional workshops to help 
participants prepare for global workshops on this issue. The developing country partic i-
pants felt especially uncomfortable about discussing an issue on which they had not 
given any thought to. Many now feel that they have a much better idea of what the key 
issues are and they will be in a better position to enter into discussions at a global level, 
before reflecting again in regional groups. The dialogue, unlike a workshop, gave the 
participants an opportunity to focus on what they understand from the issues, to identify 
the sort of information they need, and to articulate their underlying values.  
Provide assessments of impacts at regional level 
Much more detailed information should be made available to the developing country re-
spondents not so much on the effects on small island states, since this appears to be in-
ternalized, but on general environment and ecosystems of the larger countries in the 
world and how this can affect their economy. For example, according to an expert  stabi-
lization at 370 pp, would already intensify El Niño  and lead to severe consequences for 
Latin America; something not reflected in the IPCC TAR reports. 
Initial information needs 
The following section is based on an analysis of the information needs arising from the 
questionnaires, the workshop discussions both directly and indirectly.  
The information needs can be classified into four categories: 
· Information needs on impacts 
· Anthropogenic contribution to climate change; 
· Information on the correlation between GHG concentration levels and El 
Niño;  
· Information on the relationship between development, food production and 
ecological resilience;  
· Information needs on regional and local health impacts;  
· Regional impacts on ecosystems, their vulnerability and their capacity to 
adapt; 
· How can non-monetary indicators be developed, scientifically justified and 
defended in the international arena?; 
· Can a poverty mainstreaming approach be beneficial in interpreting Article 
2? 
· Information needs on new technologies 
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· Can genetic engineering provide a solution to food shortage and how will this 
affect developing countries? 
· Information needs on articulation of certain terms  
· Sustainable development;  
· Ecosystems to adapt naturally;  
· Development of models 
· Development of indicators and threshold levels; building on the ideas that 
emerged at the workshops; 
· Policy guidelines on how the information should be communicated to non-
scientists; 
· Policy guidelines on how to deal with scientific uncertainty and how to ar-
ticulate the precautionary principle; 
· Policy guideline on a process to develop indicators; 
· Development of indicators on sustainable development (link up with the 
South-South-North project on this subject). 
Need for value related research 
There was considerable discussion on the conflicts in values between countries and the 
role of values in international relations and law. There was dissatisfaction with the no-
tion that national interests alone determine how countries take respons ibility for their ac-
tions. In many of the workshops, it was emphasized by some of the participants that eq-
uity principles in Article 3 should determine the way Article 2 is interpreted. This calls 
for more value related research in international law and politics. 
Procedural aspects 
· During the process some parties realised that they had common grounds with others 
which they had not previously identified especially in relation to the relationship be-
tween climate change, commerce and security, and adaptation.  
· It was decided to continue with the pre-dialogue questionnaire process because this 
helped to involve and inform a larger group of social actors about the problem and to 
gain access to their views. However, in the following round, the questionnaire will be 
simplified and possibly include closed questions based on the information received. 
· It was also felt necessary to find ways to make the process more attractive to other 
parties such as industry and policy makers from different sectors so that they would 
also be willing to engage in the discussion and bring their perceptions to the discus-
sion. 
· Since in some of the workshops, people were torn between what they saw as fair and 
what they saw as negotiable and reasonable, possibly in the future rounds of the dia-
logue we should try and split the two notions and see if that yields ground for more 
cooperation.  
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Conclusion and Initial follow-up steps 
Overall, the HOT programme decided that it is worthwhile to continue with the iterative 
dialogue process because participants did feel that they were given a chance to focus on 
their understanding of the issues, identify the gaps in their knowledge, and articulate 
their underlying values in relation to Article 2. The dialogues showed promise as an im-
portant means to communicate and learn from people and so create a basis for dealing 
with complex environmental problems such as climate change. Given that va lues and 
norms take a long time to crystallize and that Phase 1 is but a first step in the dialogue 
process, it is too soon make any conclusions about the broader significance of the dia-
logues and what their effect on the norms surrounding Article 2 might be. Article 2’s 
definition of the ultimate goal of the climate change regime as the prevention of “dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” leaves many issues open to 
interpretation. Science is incapable of clarifying these issues because they are essentially 
based on judgment and values. The world must decide at what point it considers the 
costs of mitigation to outweigh the costs of adaptation - but there are many different 
views as to what the acceptable trade-offs are. It is clear however, that since these norms 
and trade-offs are the basis of international environmental problem solving, more re-
search needs to be conducted into the role of values and norms in this context. 
As an initial follow-up step, the HOT programme team submitted a pre-proposal to 
MISTRA in Sweden and was short-listed for submitting a proposal. This proposal has 
been submitted to MISTRA and we are now awaiting the outcomes of that discussion.  
Another follow-up proposal has been submitted by some members of the HOT pr o-
gramme to the Dutch NRP programme to undertake a dialogue within the Nether-
lands. This proposal is also under discussion. 
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1. Introduction: The Problem 
The climate change problem is being addressed through a framework convention (the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) adopted in 1992) 1 
and a series of negotiated or anticipated protocols. The Convention provides a long-term 
objective in Article 2:  
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that 
the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Convention, the stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be 
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”. 
 
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change was adopted. The Protocol includes quantitative commitments for the developed 
countries and designs mechanisms to help countries achieve their commitments in a cost-
effective manner.2 The Protocol sets an overall target of a reduction of 5.2% of global 
emissions by the year 2008-2012. This is very low in relation to the level of emission re-
ductions that may be considered necessary in order to protect the earth from dangerous 
interference (see Figure 1). Of course, the determinations of whether this is low or not 
depends on ones interpretation of what dangerous emission levels are. The challenge re-
mains that the sea level continues to rise long after the concentrations have been stabi-
lised. 
Figure 1: Stabilisation of CO2 emissions (IPCC, 2001). 
                                                 
1 The FCCC consists of 26 articles. It sets out a long-term goal, defines principles for developing 
the regime further, lists the policies and measures that countries should undertake, establishes 
a financial mechanism and outlines a reporting mechanism. The Convention entered into 
force in 1994 and has been ratified by 188 parties (including the EC). For a critical analysis 
of the content of the convention, see Bodansky 1993. 
2 For a critical analysis of the content of the Protocol see Oberthür and Ott 1999 and Grubb et al. 
1999. 
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The level at which the concentrations of GHGs are eventually stabilised determines the 
overall level of global climate change. At the same time, the level of climate change and 
the severity of its impacts are highly uncertain, particularly at the regional level. Given 
the large uncertainties about the impacts of different stabilisation levels it is necessary to 
address the question: do we need to set long-term stabilisation targets in relation to GHG 
concentrations, and are concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere the most appropriate 
indicator for setting long-term targets? 
Climate change negotiations have so far focussed almost exclusively on short-term is-
sues related to greenhouse gas mitigation in the first commitment period (2008-2012) 
and the use of flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol. However, action outlined in 
the Kyoto Protocol represents only an initial step towards achieving the overall obje ctive 
of the FCCC. 
At the same time, the debate on ratification and entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol 
has been marked by calls to broaden the ambit of the Protocol by including developing 
country GHG mitigation commitments. These demands have been countered by develop-
ing countries by references to their low cumulative and current per capita GHG emis-
sions, low per capita incomes, low GHG intensity of GDP at purchasing power parity, 
and high vulnerability and poor coping capacity to climate change impacts.3 There is an 
increasing awareness amongst developing countries of the implications of climate 
change and demand for international climate policy making to deal not only with mitiga-
tion but also the issue of adaptation. Therefore there is a strong need for dialogue 
amongst policymakers and stakeholders about acceptable and unacceptable climate 
change impacts, about fair ways of dealing with the unequal distribution of impacts, and 
about options for a fair distribution of emission control and adaptation costs. 
The level of climate change impacts is related to both the overall magnitude of the 
change, the rate at which it occurs, and the ability of the natural and human systems to 
tolerate or adapt to the change. Not all systems are equally vulnerable to climate change: 
some systems are likely to adapt more easily than others.4 Human systems may adapt 
more easily than natural systems, while developed countries generally have more ada p-
tive capabilities than developing countries. In assessing dangerous levels of climate 
change, adaptation options and capabilities need to be taken into account. This raises 
questions about how to evaluate different types of impacts and how to deal with regional 
and social differences in impacts. This also raises questions about critical impacts (im-
pacts that should guide actions) and intergenerational solidarity (i.e. what time horizon 
should be taken when considering climate change impact risks). 
The climate change problem basically constitutes a risk problem, where climate change 
impact risks need to be balanced against the risk of climate control policies. Acceptable 
levels of climate change will be defined in relation to the possible societal consequences 
of impacts, adaptation, and mitigation efforts. An assessment of non-dangerous climate 
                                                 
3 For details see Gupta 2001. 
4 See IPCC WG2, 2001. 
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change thus also entails an assessment of the implications of climate change control 
policies.  
Climate change scientists are unable to define what would be an acceptable level and 
time-frame for global concentrations of greenhouse gases to be stabilised. This is be-
cause the evaluation of climate change risks is essentially a political issue. Moreover, 
scientific uncertainties make it very difficult to assess the likelihood of possible climate 
change events and thus to quantify the risks of climate change. In short, the climate 
change issue is characterised as an unstructured problem where both the values at stake 
as well as the science are uncertain and subject to debate.  
This type of post-normal science problem requires a methodological framework within 
which scientists, policy makers and other stakeholders can enter into a dialogue to assess 
what level of ‘danger’ (in terms of possible impacts) could be attached to different levels 
of climate change, wha t could be the implications of false policy responses (policies be-
ing either too loose or too stringent), and hence, what long-term concentration levels (or 
alternative policy indicators) may be considered acceptable and unacceptable, and on 
what grounds (criteria/values). 
The climate system will respond slowly to mitigation efforts: impacts of climate change 
will continue to manifest themselves well beyond the moment global GHG emissions are 
being reduced and even after GHG concentrations have actually been stabilised. This 
means that short-term decisions about GHG emission control need to be evaluated from 
a long-term perspective, because they may foreclose long-term climate control options. 
This raises the question of what long-term climate change targets would imply for global 
emission control policies in the short to medium term (post 2012 policies). In case no 
long-term targets can be established, it raises the question of how we can hedge against 
the uncertainty about desired future levels of stabilisation of GHG concentrations. Also, 
here, a dialogue between scientists, policy makers and stakeholders is essential for de-
veloping proper strategic responses. 
The fundamental research question is then: Given the vast differences in the national in-
terests of countries, how can a common basis be developed for the further articulation of 
Article 2 of the FCCC? 
In order to address the research question, this report first undertakes a brief literature re-
view (see Chapter 2). It then explains the methodology used in the project (see Chapter 
3). The report then presents the scientific framework which was provided to the stake-
holders (see Chapter 4). Chapter 5 undertakes a comparative analysis of the different 
workshops and Chapter 6 draws some conclusions and recommendations. 
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2. Theoretical Issues and state of the art of science 
2.1 Introduction5 
As mentioned earlier, science cannot deal with hybrid questions that combine an evalua-
tion of conflicting values and conflicting science. Nor do negotiations provide an appro-
priate arena for constructively designing policy solutions with a high compliance pull on 
such issues. 
The following section provides the theoretical context for the approach developed in this 
programme. It first presents an introduction to new forms of governance and different 
problem types and the gaps. It then discusses conceptual issues in international relations 
and in international law and the gaps. It goes on to discusses conceptual issues in the sci-
ence-policy interface and the gaps. The section then introduces new solutions to bridging 
these gaps, and concludes with the identification of overall research questions.  
2.2 New forms of governance 
Environmental problems are generally classified as local, fluvial, regional or sub-
national, continental or regional and global. 6 But even local problems often have an in-
ternational dimension in that they may be recurring internationally in different parts of 
the world, or because they are caused by interlinked global production and consumption 
chains.7 Inevitably policies to deal with such environmental problems tend to be multi-
level in character. As a result new forms of governance are emerging and are raising new 
types of policy and scientific problems. Based on some overview articles and some cur-
rent global governance projects (Kersbergen and Waarden 1999, Glogov.org, etc.) one 
can argue that there are three dominant types of governance issues emerging that are 
relevant for this programme. These are: 
· Horizontal governance: relations between states and between social actors and or-
ganisations at their level in the global hierarchy. Theories that deal with such types of 
governance include negotiation theory; international law principles and concepts; in-
ternational relations schools of thought; regime theory; regulatory cooperation, coor-
dination and competition; regulatory gaps and overlaps; causality, performance and 
design; case law and coalition theory; 
· Vertical governance: focuses on relations between different levels of governance. 
Theories from different disciplines dealing with these are compliance-push and com-
pliance-pull; two and three level games; subsidiarity, competence (for EU policy) 
and top-down global decision making; sovereignty, quasi-sovereignty, bounded sov-
                                                 
5  This section is based on the work done primarily by J. Gupta. 
6  This classification tries to unite the terms used by the Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and Environment, the Netherlands Institute for Public Health and the Environment 
and the International Human Dimensions Programme on Institutions. 
7  This point has been poignantly brought forward by the Commission on Environment and De-
velopment (Agarwal et al 1990).  
Helping Operationalise article Two (HOT)  
 
16
16
ereignty, reduced sovereignty; network theory; development economics and depend-
ency theories; case law; and 
· Diagonal governance: focuses on relations between state and non-state actors. Theo-
ries dealing with these include interaction between public and private international 
law and policy; co-regulation/ corporatism and self-regulation; global integrated 
commodity chain analysis; philosophy of science and law (jurisprudence); post-
normal science/ public interest science; participatory integrated assessment; science-
policy communic ation; stakeholder research and analysis. 
The HOT programme focuses on how tools in the context of diagonal governance can be 
deve loped to support both horizontal (e.g. negotiation) and vertical (implementation and 
compliance pull) governance.  
2.3 Problem types 
On the basis of a vast amount of literature (Hisschemöller 1993, Gupta 1997, Hiss-
chemöller and Gupta 1999, Miles et al 2000, etc.), problems can be classified at the 
global level as: 
· Structured8 problems: These problems are problems in which there is vertical and 
horizontal consensus on the nature of the science and the values. Such problems are 
relatively easy to address via international negotiations. 
· Moderately structured problems (horizontal): These are those problems in which the 
negotiators from the different states are able to agree with each other on the contours 
of a problem but do not have much domestic support for their views.9 Here interests 
appear to converge at international level but there are strong differences of opinion 
on national interests.  
· Moderately structured problems (vertical): These are problems that have been well 
discussed domestically and there is strong consensus on values and science. How-
ever, at the international level there is considerable difference of opinion. 
· Unstructured problems: Finally, there are unstructured problems (also referred to in 
the literature as malign and wicked) where there is neither agreement on science or 
values between or within countries. In such cases, if a treaty is negotiated it may be 
limited to policy aspirations. 
The HOT programme focuses on developing tools for governance that can facilitate 
problem solving in relation to unstructured problems. This is because we believe on the 
basis of past work and on the basis of the first phase of HOT that climate change is es-
sentially an unstructured problem. 
                                                 
8 Other words used in the literature are benign, simple, etc. 
9 This is the case when the problem is signalled first at international level and international 
agreement tends to precede domestic agreement. This is the case also when unilateral action 
has only limited value and governments are afraid of free riders on the one hand; and on the 
other hand are taking a pioneer role upon themselves. In such a case although treaty making 
is possible there are severe doubts about the ability of countries to actually implement their 
obligations. 
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2.4 International relations and gaps 
International relations theory focuses, inter alia, on perspectives based on different 
schools of thought about how the world is constructed. While realists have always ar-
gued that power politics determine solutions even in the environmental arena, regime 
analysts have argued that the solutions we see emerging in the internationa l arena in rela-
tion to global commons problems cannot simply be explained in terms of power politics. 
They argue instead that increasingly co-operation is being institutionalised and that de-
spite the vast differences of interests between countries progress can be made. Many ar-
gue that in the area of benign or structured issues, reaching constructive solutions is not 
too complicated. In general, structured problems are relatively easy calling only for the 
harmonisation of domestic policies. On the other hand, when it comes to complex, un-
structured problems, they suggest certain practical solutions based on empirical observa-
tions of what actually works in the international arena. 
Thus the literature argues that in order to increase regime effectiveness in complex prob-
lems, it is important to limit the scope of the issues under discussion. It is necessary to 
deal with easy issues first and to undertake a pragmatic single -issue approach (Young 
1989, 1995, Sebenius 1993, Andresen and Wettestad 1992, Hansenclever, Mayer and 
Rittberger 1996, Miles et al 2000). In more complex co-ordination problems, negotia-
tions could benefit greatly from using ‘efficient princ ipled’ negotiation strategies (Fisher 
and Ury 1981). Here all countries are invited to participate in the in itial stage of problem 
solving so as to increase the legitimacy of the dialogue and then the follow-up could be re-
stricted to a small group of countries (Andresen and Wettestad 1992: 277-291). It is impor-
tant to simplify the issue and to divide the problem into easily manageable issues. Each is-
sue should be dealt with separately. The focus would be to build on agreement and avoid 
polarised issues. Deadlocks can be resolved by providing countries side-payments and 
other incentives and compensation (Haas 1980; Sebenius 1993; Sand 1992). This approach 
can be summed up as an approach that develops incrementally, avoids difficult issue-areas; 
develops sectoral solutions and tends to be technocratic in perspective (Gupta 1997: 177-
178). This approach tend to build on the logic of consequences. 
However, such techniques work best when the system has to be fine-tuned. When the 
problem is complex and calls for drastic structural changes, such strategies may lead to 
tall-chimney solutions (solutions that merely postpone the problem or transfer it to an-
other place), divide and rule approaches, an excess reliance on technocratism and may 
not automatically deal with the systemic aspects of the problem. 10  
Hence, we find that although Article 2 is the corner stone of the Climate Change Con-
vention, because it raises such complicated issues, it is continuously bypassed in discus-
sions. 
                                                 
10 If such a strategy is used in the case of moderately structured problems and unstructured prob-
lems, then it tends to exploit the lack of mandate of the negotiators from several countries 
and/or the imbalance in political power between countries and may lead to latent conflict be-
tween countries.  
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2.5 International law and gaps 
International law deals with the legal aspects of interstate and international relations. On 
the basis of the literature, we would like to make two inter-related points. First, interna-
tional law has seven functions. It aims at ensuring peace and order through the provision 
of rules of procedure, it provides the language of diplomacy and tools of interpretation, it 
codifies and harmonises state practice, it develops norms and promotes the progressive 
development of international law, it provides rules, it establishes organisational struc-
tures for, inter alia, dispute resolution and it influences state practice and, finally, it in-
fluences and regulates the behaviour of state and non-state actors in the promotion of in-
ternational peace and security. These are both assumptions about the role of law as well 
as observations based on how law actually functions. Having said that, we would like to 
argue that these functions of law can be empirically tested in the context of structured 
problems. However, in the context of unstructured problems there are major difficulties 
in interpreting texts, which, because of the negotiations, take on a diffuse character; in 
promoting new norms that are commonly acceptable to all countries; and in influencing 
state practice. This is because countries are not necessarily consistent about their values, 
and their choice of norms differs from issue to issue, context to context. Thus while the 
OECD countries have adopted the polluter pays principle as an important legal principle 
within the context of the OECD, this principle has not been accepted in the context of the 
climate change negotiations.  
This br ings us to our second point. International law has traditionally evolved through 
harmonisation of domestic laws and through the codification of existing principles. 
However, in modern environmental problems, international law is developing as a result 
of the recommendations made by scientific institutions that are closely related, since the 
existing principles are inadequate for dealing with the problem. Thus, we find that it is 
the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) process that feeds in ideas for 
developing institutions and instruments for dealing with the climate change treaty. But 
the IPCC process does not discuss norms. There is no independent scientific process tak-
ing place that examines the international legal norms available and discusses how these 
norms should be developed further in order to guarantee the rule of law and justice in the 
international arena. This is why the new international laws being developed are taking on 
an increasingly ‘rationalistic’ character and becoming technocratic instruments for prob-
lem ‘management’. We believe that this will not lead to real problem-solving. Instead we 
believe that prior to negotiations, there needs to be a process that allows for the determi-
nation of the values by which the problem can be addressed. In other words we believe 
that the logic of “appropriateness” is also important in dealing with unstructured prob-
lems  
2.6 Science-policy issues and gaps 
On the basis of a vast amount of literature,11 we can argue that at the global level there 
are huge gaps between the scientific and the policy community (the two cultures theory). 
There are also gaps between competing scientific schools of thought (scientific plural-
                                                 
11 eg. Snow 1964, Caplan 1979, Rich 1991, Annan 2003, Gupta 1997/2000. 
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ism), different pr ofessional and problem solving cultures from local through to global 
levels, different professional and ideological cultures in different parts of the world and 
because of the structural imbalance in know ledge between the blocs.  
These gaps are further aggravated by the predictions from the theories in relation to 
knowledge use which argue that science is either used in the public interest (normative 
theories), inadequately used because of poor communication between the two communi-
ties (two culture theory), used in the private interest (public choice theory), used when it 
is in line with existing policies and expectations (rational actor), or that policy is the re-
sult of politics and not of rational expertise.12 
These predictions in relation to knowledge use become even more sombre at the interna-
tional level, where power politics often has a dominant role in determining how science 
is to be used. (For example, any reasonably influential country can prevent the IPCC 
from including a chapter on a particular subject. The US successfully aborted the IPCC 
project to have a special report on climate change and sustainable development). 
One can conclude that at the global level there are disciplinary gaps 13 (where each disci-
pline or even a combination of disciplines gives only a partial analysis), expertise gaps 
(in relation to dealing with uncertainty, the inclusion of values and competing values in 
discussions, the problem of ivory tower knowledge not based on the knowledge of social 
actors, the problem of democratic deficit in scientific evaluation), and bloc gaps (the 
problem of the different levels of knowledge in different parts of the world). There are 
also policy gaps between different countries and between ministries within countries. 
2.7 Bridging the gaps through new tools of governance 
The problem identification process helps us to understand that while current tools of 
(global) governance can be used successfully in structured problems, the global commu-
nity lacks tools to deal with unstructured problems. The international law gap leads us to 
focus on the need for: a preparatory phase prior to the negotiation of soft law documents 
in unstructured problems; the need to nurture normative communities world-wide to 
support the identification of common values to deal with global problems; and possibly 
the need for citizen juries to make choices in critical issues. The international relations 
gap focuses on the need for social and scientific learning processes and accelerated is-
sue-linkages as a way to increase the avenues of finding mutual solutions. The science-
policy interface discussion focuses on the inability of the communities to understand and 
communicate with each other, and, worse, the lack of willingness to do so because of the 
institutional contexts within which such discussions take place. 
Public interest and post-normal scientists have tried to bridge the gap through stake-
holder research and participatory integrated assessment. Policymakers have tried to 
bridge the gap (at pr imarily national level) through science-policy institutions (e.g. 
IPCC), stakeholder participation and focus groups, participatory technology assessments 
and citizens tribunals (Fischer 2001), commissions of experts (e.g. Brundtland Commis-
                                                 
12 Rich 1991, Lindblom et al. 1979, van de Vall 1998, Lazarsfeld 1967, Marin 1981, Boehmer-
Christianson 1999. 
13 cf. Woodhouse and Nieusma 2001.  
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sion), commission of stakeholders (e.g. World Commission on Dams), tripartite agree-
ments (e.g. the Global Compact), and Global Dialogues (e.g. the North-South dialogue, 
the dialogues established by the WSSD, and the Climate and Water Dialogue). Although 
there are some examples of global dialogues, none of these were based on any scientific 
principles or had any formally established rules of procedure and the term dialogue was 
loosely applied to these meetings. The table below sums up the disciplinary gaps and 
ways to bridge these gaps: 
Table 1 Bridging the disciplinary gaps. 
Discipline Gap Bridging the gap 
Policy sciences Lack of tools to deal with  
unstructured problems 
Problem structuring processes 
International relations Power politics frames the con-
text in which science is used 
especially in unstructured 
problems 
Need for accelerated strategies 
such as appropriate issue-
linkages; 
Need for social and scientific 
learning to help social actors 
broaden their horizons beyond 
narrow personal and state in-
terests 
International law Lack of a preparatory phase 
prior to the negotiation of soft 
law documents in unstructured 
problems;  
Lack of new norms at the 
global level; 
Too much reliance on negotia-
tion processes based on power 
politics to solve global prob-
lems does not lead to solutions 
The need for a preparatory 
phase – possibly through a dia-
logue; 
The need to nurture normative 
communities world-wide to  
support the identification of  
common values to deal with 
global problems;  
The need for citizen juries to 
evaluate the state of current  
science and values in order to  
address global problems 
Policy Use theories Culture gap between and 
among policy and scientific 
communities at the horizontal, 
vertical and diagonal level; 
Mono-disciplinary, regional 
and ivory tower bias; 
Personal, national and political 
motivations cloud the ability of 
the policymaker to use to sci-
ence in the public interest 
Science-policy dialogue at  
national through to global lev-
els 
The dialogue process Information about knowledge 
gaps in specific areas and in  
relation to combination of  
knowledge 
Developing a scientific process 
for seeking answers to these 
specific questions through a 
matching of scientist with 
question 
 
Bringing the different ideas together, we argue that there is need for: 
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· structuring the problem; 
· through identifying and addressing the information needs; 
· through developing a modus operandi to deal with uncertainty; 
· through identifying the different values of the different actors; 
· through understanding and trying to develop common value systems that apply to all 
countries; 
· through understanding the different interests involved;  
· through re-defining the problem to increase the space for reaching common under-
standing of the issues and learning to respect the views and va lues of others. 
This can be attempted through a number of different tools including: 
· interactional series of local through to global science-policy dialogues; 
· support from links with scientific communities;  
· development of normative communities that support the development and interpreta-
tion of common norms (e.g. the human rights communities);  
· the use of issue-linkages to help prioritise the problem at hand, especially for the less 
powerful countries, and  
· the possibility of using citizen juries to decide on critical issues. 
The dialogues can become effective if they openly: 
· politicise arguments; become explicit about the political choices; 
· make value systems explicit and transparent; 
· nationalise arguments (use-issue linkages with national priorities); and at the same 
time;  
· de-nationalise the arguments (in search of what is good for all).  
The purpose of these instruments is to enable social and scientific learning, to adopt a 
truth and reconciliation approach, and to build the necessary social capital in order for 
societies to work towards sustainable development.  
2.8 Formulating research questions 
Therefore, the overall research question for this programme is:  
Can an interacting set of global, regional and national dialogues between stakeholders 
in a non-confrontational setting provide opportunities for social and scientific learning 
that can enhance the long-term, prospects for global cooperation on complex problems 
such as climate change? 
Phase 1 of HOT focused on identifying the global support for such an idea; Phase 2 will 
focus on experimenting further with the idea and leading to both social and scientific 
learning on the one hand and to theoretical insights on the other hand. Phase 3 will focus 
on testing whether social and scientific learning actually contributes to more informed 
negotiations, better la wmaking and sustainable development through the identification of 
clear environmental goals.  
Regarding the more specific research questions  a distinction can be made between sub-
stantive and process–oriented questions. The substantive questions are related to the in-
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formation demands of the dialogue. These will be steered by the dialogue itself, but are 
likely to include the following:  
1.  How can Article 2 of the FCCC be elaborated into quantitative indicators for climate 
change control? What operational criteria could be developed to indicate dangerous 
and non-dangerous levels of anthropogenic interference with the climate system? 
What indicators can be selected that are both politically relevant and publicly com-
prehensible and appealing, and can be scientific ally substantiated (attributable to 
climate change, reliable/valid, measurable, predictable)? How can different indic a-
tors be aggregated? 
2.  What are the options for adaptation to avoid exceeding thresholds levels? What level 
of adaptation is feasible and acceptable?  
3.  How can the indicator levels be related to the cause – effect chain of climate change? 
How are the indicator levels and the risks of exceeding of critical levels related to 
levels of climate change? How can the levels of climate change be related to long-
term goals for stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations? How do these long-
term concentration levels relate to greenhouse gas emission levels on the long term 
and the short-term? What would be the implications of limiting the risks of exceed-
ing long-term indicators thresholds levels for global emission control on the short- to 
medium term (the post Kyoto period)?  
4.  What are the options and costs of meeting long-term stabilisation targets? How are 
its feasibility and costs related to socio-economic and technological developments, 
social and institutional barriers, and the timing of mitigation efforts? How can risks 
of high future policy adjustment costs be limited (e.g. hedging)?  
5.  How can we deal with the unequal distribution of climate impacts and mitigation ca-
pabilities? What can be the role of supporting adaptation and/or providing compensa-
tion? How can mitigation costs be (e)valuated against adaptation costs/climate im-
pacts? 
6.  What is the value of climate indicators and long-term climate targets for developing 
an effective international climate change regime and rallying societal support for 
dealing with climate change? 
In particular Phase 1 focused on an inventory and preliminary discussion of these issues 
at national and/or regional level, as well as some initial experimentation with the rules of 
procedure for developing such a dialogue.  
The Phase 1dialogue aimed to understand: 
· What do participants understand as key issues in Article 2? 
· What are the key knowledge gaps that need to be addressed? 
· Do participants believe that a discussion of Article 2 is critical for the future deve l-
opment of the climate change regime? 
· Did the regional and / or national dialogue increase the level of understanding of the 
partic ipants? 
· Do the participants see a need for an interacting set of global and national dialogues 
as a first step towards the process of further elaborating on Article 2 of the climate 
change convention?
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3. Phase 1 Research Protocol 
3.1 Introduction 
A methodological protocol was developed for the programme, of which this project is 
the first step. This chapter explains the methodology used in this first phase of the pr o-
gramme; it first explains the framework of the dialogues (4.2), discusses the key actors 
in HOT (4.3), explains the need for pre-dialogue preparations (4.4), gives the structure of 
the workshops (4.5), and finally identifies an approach for collating the information 
(4.6). 
3.2 Framework of the Dialogues 
The overall framework of the HOT dialogues is represented in the figure below – a set of 
iterative dialogues moving from pre-dialogue preparation to regional and national dia-
logues to  a global dialogue (and then back out again). Phase 1 is comprised of the initial 
dialogue preparation and the first regional and national dialogues. The regional and na-
tional dialogues then pr ovide input and lessons learned for the global dialogues (Phase 2) 
which in turn provide input for the second round of regional and national dialogues. 
 
Figure 2 A schematic overview of the interactional set of dialogues. 
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3.3 Key Actors 
The actors in HOT can be split into two categories, the project partners and the actual 
dialogue participants.  The partners make up a research consortium which both organizes 
and studies the dialogue as well as providing the scientific input.  They include: 
· Coordinating Partners – IVM, RIVM and TERI. The IVM will serve as the lead and 
is therefore the project office; 
· Regional Partners – ENDA, TERI, COPPE, RIVM; 
· Scientific Partners – Tyndall and COPPE; 
In terms of participants, the relevant stakeholders were identified from government, pub-
lic NGOs, private NGOs, potential losers from environmental regulation, scie n-
tists/researchers, and the media. The regional partners were relied upon to identify the 
major players in their area. 
In the actual dialogues there were also key roles for Procedural and Substantive Chairs 
and Recorders. The procedural and substantive chairs provided guidance to the dialogues 
by both guiding the content of discussion in useful directions and by ensuring that dis-
cussion remained respectful and comfortable for all participants. Recorders were neces-
sary to provide a record of the dialogue, but since participants may have felt constrained 
by this activity, it was agreed that comments would not be attributed to individual par-
ticipants. 
3.4 Pre-Dialogue Preparations/Consultations 
In order for the dialogues to be effective, the ground had to be prepared ahead of time. 
This meant understanding the key issues and sounding out stakeholders in advance, so 
that the dialogue would result in meaningful interaction. 
For the partners this meant that they know how to run a dialogue.  For the stakeholders 
this meant understanding: the key issues related to Article 2: the consequences and out-
comes of climate change policies: issues of controversy:  the role of science: and their 
own expectations and desires. The scientists involved prepared a concise background 
paper dealing with scientif ic perspectives on Article 2 (see Chapter 3). In addition, they 
tried to provide region-specific information on the possible impacts of climate change 
and options for adaptation and mitigation; as well as general information to introduce 
stakeholders to the ideas of vulnerability to climate change, and adaptive capacity. This 
was done on the basis of the needs expressed by the stakeholders. 
Finally, the method of gathering and collating the information was established. Each 
partner was responsible for the format for their region whether it was phone or written 
surveys, workshops, etc. The synthesis of this information was used to form the structure 
of the regional dialogue. 
3.5 Methodology for the Regional Dialogues 
This section details how the regional dialogues themselves were conducted. 
Criteria for selecting participants for the regional meetings were as follows: Approxi-
mately 20 individuals were selected from the various groups of stakeholders. It was at-
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tempted to have the participants represent the viewpoint of a significant population, be 
positive towards the project, able to participate fully, be well prepared, and willing to 
make a contribution. It was hoped that a substantial portion of the participants would be 
able to continue with Phase Two of the dia logue.  A tentative plan calls for approxi-
mately 1/3 of the participants from each dialogue to move onto the global dialogue. 
The meetings had the following structure: 1) Introductory session – a meet and greet: 2) 
Issues for the agenda – discussion of draft agenda: 3) Rules of procedure – procedural 
rules are agreed by all: 4)Roles in the dialogue – roles of each person are explained; 5) 
Discussion – substantive issues were aired.  The content of the dialogue was then ana-
lysed and evaluated so as to discern areas of disagreement and overlap between the par-
ties, and deepen future discussions.  
The dialogues hinged on the participants being candid and uninhibited. This meant that 
privacy was assured, but also that they understood the expectations and risks of the dia-
logue before hand, i.e. what they were getting into and what they would get out of it. 
They also had to understand the procedure so that there were no surprises. 
The partners were also prepared for the risks that presented themselves from their side. 
These included: participants not committing their time and offering their opinions; the 
dialogues are beyond participant levels of comprehension; too many irresolvable differ-
ences among participants; and negative or hostile participants.  The substantive and pro-
cedural chair aimed to prevent these problems, however some were unavoidable. 
3.6 Collating the information 
The structure of the meeting was based on the “clustering” of similar views.  These clus-
ters were based on the participants’ positions on Artic le 2.  Many alternative clusterings 
were possible and the appropriate divisions depended on the people who responded, the 
level of depth in their responses and the analytical traction provided by the grouping.  
Participants were welcome to give input on the clustering. 
Once the clustering was completed, the responses within the cluster could have been 
analysed to understand the factual and causal claims and value statements explicitly 
stated or implied by the arguments. We anticipated that a hierarchy in the level of argu-
ment would appear thus: 
· Positions (policy claims); 
· Interests; 
· Reality Claims – facts, causality; 
· Normative Claims – Cultural values, social roles and status, geography, history etc. 
However, the preparation for most of the workshops revealed that in the first stage we 
could only hope to make an inventory of positions and informational needs given the de-
gree of complexity of the problem. Hence, in order to make the discussions less complex 
and abstract and to link them to domestic priorities and concerns, the dialogues took a 
different approach. Instead of focusing on what concentration levels are necessary to 
avoid “dangerous” interference with the climate system, the dialogues began by working 
backwards.  That is, they started with the sort of outcomes that could be considered ac-
ceptable and  unacceptable, and then worked their way back to the concentration levels 
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that correspond to these acceptable or  unacceptable outcomes. Hence a combination of 
two approaches as depicted in the figure below was used. 
 
Once participants were satisfied that their arguments were fairly represented, they could 
then begin to see how different actors saw the problem of climate change. Considering 
whether the differing arguments were reasonable  or unreasonable, and questioning 
their basis, allowed for the introduction of space  into the process – that is, room for par-
ties to manoeuvre and change their assessment of the situation.  
The point of the dialogues was not to change the participants’ negotiating positions how-
ever. Dialogue success rather, was defined as a situation in which participants from dif-
ferent groups listened openly to each other, felt that they were truly listened to, were 
fully involved in the discussion, and were given a chance to reflect on their own position 
without compromising their core values.  The point is that the dialogues are not related 
to political negotiations. The overall aim of the exercise is to increase understanding and 
explore new areas of agreement by providing a neutral and open environment – not to di-
rectly impact the ongoing climate negotiations. 
What became increasingly apparent however, was that most of the participants neither 
had a clear-cut position on Article 2 based on reasoned arguments, detailed estimates of 
indicators, nor perceptions of threshold values.  Instead they were still at the stage of 
calling for more information in order to be able to make an informed pos ition. Although 
we initially did intend to cluster the different views, we discovered that in most cases it 
made more sense to inventorize the informational needs emerging from the different per-
spectives. It is anticipated that dealing with these informational needs will help to pr o-
vide a common starting point for developing different positions.  
 
Position
Arguments
Values
Space for agreement
Space for agreement
Clustering
1 2
Indicators
Threshold 
values
Concen-
trations
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4. Scientific input14 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the state of the scientific knowledge surround-
ing the definition of dangerous climate change, in order to set the scene for the regional 
dialogues being carried out as part of phase one of the HOT project. The HOT project is 
being undertaken in the context of a recognition that an understanding of what consti-
tutes dangerous climate change as laid down in Article 2 of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) is of great importance to debates around 
present and future climate policy.1  
4.2  Non-anthropogenic versus anthropogenic climate change 
Along with world population growth and global economic expansion over the past cen-
tury, intensified human activities, particularly energy intensive activities, have altered 
the properties of the Earth’s atmosphere. This has altered the functioning of the global 
climate system.  As concluded by the latest assessment report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001a), the Earth’s climate system has demonstrably 
changed on both global and regional scales since the pre-industrial era, with at least 
some of these changes clearly attributable to human activities. 
The global annual average surface air temperature has been increasing since 1860, when 
the instrumental record started.  In the twentieth century, the Earth’s surface temperature 
increased by about 0.6oC, with the 1990s being the warmest decade and 1998 the warm-
est year. Using proxy data for the Northern Hemisphere, he mispheric temperature series 
have been established for the past millennium (IPCC 2001a).  This reconstruction indi-
cates that the 1990s is likely to have been the warmest decade in the past thousand years.   
As well as the rise in global average temperature, changes in other features of global 
climate have also taken place -- precipitation has very likely increased during the twenti-
eth century by 5 to 10 per cent over most mid - and high latitudes of the Northern Hemi-
sphere continents; global average sea leve l rose by between 1 and 2 mm per year during 
the past 100 years; snow cover and sea-ice extent have generally decreased, especially in 
the Northern Hemisphere; and warm episodes of the El Niño/Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO) phenomenon have become more frequent, persistent and intense since the mid-
1970s, compared with the previous 100 years.   
With so much evidence for changes in the Earth’s climate, one would naturally ask the 
question what has caused this change?  Global climate varies naturally, due both to what 
is called ‘internal variability’ within the climate system and to changes in external forc-
ing unrelated to human behaviour – for example, changes in solar irradiance and vol-
canic activity.  The reconstruction of temperature over the past thousand years suggests, 
however, that the warming over the twentieth century is unusual and unlikely to be 
                                                 
14  Prepared by Alex Haxeltine of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, May 2003. 
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merely the response of the system to natural forcing.  Indeed, detection and attribution 
studies consistently find evidence for an anthropogenic signal in the climate record of the 
last 35 to 50 years, despite uncertainties in forcing due to anthropogenic aerosols and 
natural factors.  Furthermore, recent climate model experiments show that natural causes 
of global temperature variability cannot, on their own, explain the observed surface 
warming of about 0.6°C.  When these experiments are repeated using rising historic con-
centrations of greenhouse gases and shifting distributions of sulphate aerosols, much bet-
ter agreement between observed and modelled global patterns of temperature change is 
achieved.  Hence, the latest IPCC Assessment concluded that, 
“… there is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 
50 years is attributable to human activities.” (IPCC, 2001a). 
With the inertia  in our energy systems and the long memory exhibited by the climate 
system, this human-induced climate change will continue in the decades and centuries to 
come.  Actions to mitigate climate change may yet slow the rate of climate change, but 
will not stop it.  To better prepare our societies for the potential changes in climate, con-
siderable efforts have been made to project the likely regional and global climatic conse-
quences of a range of plausible socio-economic development pathways.   
Taking into account a wide range of possible future greenhouse gas emissions and em-
bracing the uncertainty implicit in climate modelling, the globally-averaged surface air 
temperature is projected to rise by 1.4° to 5.8oC over the period 1990 to 2100 (IPCC, 
2001a).  This magnitude of change is about two to ten times larger than the warming ob-
served over the twentieth century.  Based on paleoclimate data, this projected rate of 
change is very likely to be without precedent during at least the last 10,000 years.  Cor-
responding to the range of change in global temperature, global-average sea level is pr o-
jected to rise by 9 to 88 cm between the years 1990 to 2100.  Globally-averaged precipi-
tation is also projected to increase during the twenty-first century.  Changes in some cli-
matic variables can be substantially different from the global-average at the regional 
scale, and for some variables such as precipitation, cloud cover and relative humidity, 
the sign of change might even be different from region to region.   
Apart from changes in average climatic features, the build-up of atmospheric greenhouse 
gases is projected to change the duration, location, frequency and intensity of extremes 
of weather (for example, heatwaves, intense rainfall events, tropical cyclones, etc.), 
which would alter and/or disrupt the functioning of many natural biophysical and human 
socio-economic systems. 
In the face of certainly continuing, probably accelerating and possibly unprecedented 
changes in the Earth’s climate over the upcoming decades and centuries, what should be 
our response?  As evidence is emerging that some physical and biological systems are 
already reacting to climate change, and as we know that at least for some regions and for 
some communities climate variability already imposes huge costs, doing nothing is 
unlikely to be the best option.  Humanity needs to develop and implement appropriate 
strategies to reduce the risks associated with climate change – to ensure that changing 
climatic resources are exploited and that changing climatic  hazards are minimised.  Mit i-
gation measures are required to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions with the inte n-
tion of eventually stabilising atmospheric concentrations at a level at which an accept-
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able dynamic equilibrium could be sustained between climate, ecosystems and human 
society.  On the other hand, due to the inertia of the climate system, greenhouse gases 
accumulated in the atmosphere since the pre-industrial era will continue to affect global 
climate long into the future.  This makes adaptive measures inevitable in order to en-
hance the coping range of ecological and socio-economic systems.     
4.3 Science’s role in defining dangerous climate change 
The Delhi Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development2, which 
emerged in October 2002 from the Eighth Conference of the Parties to the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) reiterates the need to avoid 
dangerous climate change as the FCCC’s ultimate objective.3 According to the Third As-
sessment Report (TAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
however, deciding what constitutes dangerous climate change is a value judgement be-
yond the remit of the IPCC and perhaps of science itself.4 Indeed, there is no universally 
established methodology or process for deciding what constitutes a dangerous level of 
climate change, and for whom.5 Nonetheless, implicitly or explicitly, researchers have 
suggested arbitrary thresholds in climate change, or in the impacts of climate change, 
which they themselves designate as dangerous, undesirable or to be avoided. Some con-
trasting examples are shown below: 
 
Examples of external definitions of dangerous climate change 
Danger measured through threshold in physical vulnerability 
• Large-scale eradication of coral reef systems 6 
• Disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet 7 
• Breakdown of the thermohaline circulation 8 
• Qualitative modification of crucial climate-system patterns such as ENSO, NAO 9 
• Climate change exceeding the rate at which biomes can migrate 10 
 
Danger measured through threshold in social vulnerability 
• Irrigation demand exceeding 50% of seasonal water usage for agriculture in northern Victoria 11 
• Depopulation of sovereign atoll countries 12 
• Additional millions of people at risk from water shortage, malaria, hunger and coastal flooding 13 
• Destabilisation of international order by environmental refugees and emergence of conflicts 14 
• World impacts exceeding a threshold percentage of GDP 15 
 
 
4.4 Internal versus external definitions of dangerous climate change 
So far most of the scientific research on defining dangerous climate change has focused 
on what we term external definitions of danger. External definitions are usually based on 
risk analysis of system characteristics of the physical or social world. Recent work at the 
Tyndall Centre has emphasized that research on defining dangerous climate change or in 
developing sustainable responses must recognise the central role played by perceptions 
of danger. There are therefore competing perspectives on dangerous climate change, 
what we term ‘external’ and ‘internal’ definitions of risk. Internal definitions of danger 
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recognise that to be real, danger has to be either experienced or to be perceived – it is the 
individual or collective experience or perception of insecurity or lack of safety that con-
stitutes the danger. A robust policy response must appreciate both external and internal 
definitions of danger. 
The research process leading to these various definitions of danger has followed two dif-
ferent paradigms. The more frequently followed paradigm utilises what we term ‘top-
down’ methods.16 This framework (upper left triangle in Figure 1) follows an essentially 
linear approach and quantifies indic ators of physical vulnerability based on scenarios of 
future socio-economic change that are used as inputs to a series of hierarchical models. 
These types of assessments typically define danger, either globally or locally, in terms of 
physical measures (e.g., affected crop yield or water availability), threats to the contin-
ued function of some part of the non-human world, or in terms of people at risk or reduc-
tion in economic welfare. The scenarios used often assume no adaptation will take place 
as the danger threshold is approached. Sometimes a single adaptation action is assumed 
and modelled, while a few analyses assume adaptation occurs simply on the basis of ra-
tional choice.17 
The ‘bottom-up’ approach (as shown by the bottom left triangle in Figure 1) focuses on 
the social vulnerability of individuals or groups to both existing climate variability and 
climatic change. This approach tests social and economic theories of the determinants of 
vulnerability across a region or between socio-economic groups, leading to social indic a-
tors of danger and vulnerability such as poverty, lack of access to health or other ser-
vices, or lack of empowerment.18 This approach also uses reasoning by analogy, i.e., 
learning from past experience of how communities have coped with extreme events.19 In 
contrast to ‘top-down’ methods, recognising adaptive capacity is usually implicit in such 
approaches. 
There are also a few attempts to integrate these two approaches to try to derive a more 
holistic definition of vulnerability for the purposes of adaptation to a changing climate.20 
While recognising the scientific value and policy relevance of these research efforts, we 
note that all these definitions of danger remain ‘external’ in the sense that they are ob-
served or modelled according to judgements of individual or collectives of scientists. 
But danger can also be defined in terms of insecurity or lack of safety. So, for example, 
in the context of climate change it is the perceived insecurity arising from realised or an-
tic ipated impacts associated with changing extreme weather events, and often immediate 
threats to life and livelihood, which are of greatest concern to individuals or, colle c-
tively, to society. This definition of dangerous climate change is therefore based on psy-
chological, social, moral, institutional and cultural processes that influence perceptions 
of individuals and societies about what constitutes danger.21 The perceptions of danger 
are determined by personal experience, values, information and trust (Figure 1). 
 
HOT programme 
 
31
31
 
These external and internal definitions of dangerous climate change interact with each 
other. Perceptions of what is dangerous are, to an extent, informed by a technical analy-
sis of risk (external definition), for example as provided by the IPCC in the form of a 
state-of-the-art assessment of the science of climate change. The amount of information, 
the legitimacy of who gives the information and the other determinants shown in Figure 
1, will transform this external definition into perception of what constitutes dangerous 
climate change (internal definition). Information on the risk of an individual’s house be-
ing flooded or discussion about the widespread collapse of coral reefs, for example, do 
much to formulate perceptions of danger. Conversely, societal or individual perceptions 
of what constitutes dangerous climate change will have an impact on the way it is re-
searched and externally defined, hence the arrows between the two definitions in Figure 
1. A further dimension of this analysis is the role of expectations and how external defi-
nitions of danger can change individual behaviour. The prediction that an atoll country 
would become effectively uninhabitable through reduced land area and water availabil-
ity, for example, could change behaviour such that resources would be over-exploited 
making the uninhabitability more likely and the prediction self-fulfilling. 22 
These examples show that definitions of dangerous climate change are socially con-
structed and involve deeply reflexive processes23 made up of the interplay between ex-
ternal and internal definitions. Thus climate change science exhibits the classic charac-
teristics of strong uncertainty and of a ‘post-normal’ science in terms of framing and 
execution of links to public policy.24 
4.5 The potential contribution of the HOT dialogue 
The HOT dialogue has the potential to break new ground by combining scientific in-
sights with dialogue on Article 2 (including the definition of dangerous climate change), 
and it is in this spirit which this briefing paper is presented.   
The preceding discussion highlights that it is importa nt to understand the assumptions 
implicit in external definitions of dangerous climate change and their implications for 
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perceptions of danger. The internal perceptions of danger have been considerably under-
researched in the area of climate change (but the distinction between ‘danger’ as an ob-
jective measure and danger as experienced is well recognised in other areas e.g. in un-
derstanding the causes and consequences of famine).  The HOT dialogue should there-
fore attempt to recognise and be aware of the internal/external distinction in its explora-
tion of ways to operationalise Article 2. 
The purpose of this paper should not be to prescribe the dialogue in anyway. However, 
such a background paper clearly plays a role in framing the dialogue, and this should be 
made explicit.  Thus the remainder of this paper aims to providing a framing for some of 
the issues that might be addressed in the first phase of the dialogue. Section 2 provides a 
sketch -- by region -- of the major vulnerabilities to climate change presented as an over-
view and for three sample sectors: agriculture, water and biodiversity and natural ecosys-
tems. These sectors were chosen by the HOT core project team as being a relevant sub-
sample for the initial framing of the HOT dialogues, and subseque nt HOT briefing pa-
pers may well address additional sectors.  Section 3 addresses indicators, thresholds and 
adaptation. One way to proceed with a dialogue on defining dangerous climate change is 
to identify indicators of dangerous climate change and concomitant threshold values that 
represent the limits of acceptable le vels of the impact. The aim in this section then is 
specifically not to influence the dialogue with a in-depth discussion of indicators and 
thresholds but rather to set the scene for the HOT dialogue itself to generate original in-
sights into suitable indicators and likely “dangerous” values or thresholds for these indi-
cators. 
4.6 A regional overview of vulnerabilities to climate change  
The IPCC Third Assessment Report provides an authoritative synthesis of the current 
state of scientific knowledge on vulnerabilities to climate change (IPCC 2001b). Here we 
present a broad overview of the major vulnerabilities for different regions with a focus 
on the selected sectors of water resources, food security, and biodiversity and natural 
ecosystems. This overview is based largely on the IPCC assessment supplemented with 
some more recent sources: the aim is not to give a comprehensive overview of impacts 
but simply to provide an indicative framing of some of the key vulnerabilities as a basis 
for the dialogues within the HOT project. 
In this paper we address mainly vulnerabilities rather than impacts. This is because a dis-
cussion of impacts requires an estimate an actual magnitude of climate change at some 
future date, and this requires a climate change scenario. As future magnitudes of climate 
change will be crucially dependent on what happens to anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases, the definition of appropriate climate scenarios is a very complex task - 
one which we do not wish to address in this paper. Rather by addressing vulnerabilities 
to climate change the focus is placed on the system that will be impacted by climate 
change. The IPCC defines vulnerability as follows:  
The degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects 
of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a func-
tion of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to which a system is 
exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity (IPCC 2001b, p995). 
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Note that this definition emphasizes that vulnerability is not just a function of the abs o-
lute magnitude of a change in a climate variable, but also of the rate at which it changes. 
The vulnerability of a forest ecosystem to climate change would be a good example: if 
the rate of change of climate is below a certain threshold new tree species might be able 
to migrate to new sites as the climate changes, but above a certain rate of change the 
climate will be cha nging at a rate greater than the maximum rate of migration of the 
relevant tree species and the ecosystem will experience an increased level of vulnerabil-
ity.  
The key climatic variables usually associated with assessing vulnerabilities to climate 
change are temperature and precipitation. However, increased levels of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere also crucially have a direct affect natural ecosystems and especially 
vegetation. This direct effect is complex as it tends to involve both a reduction in 
evapotranspiration and a stimulation of photosynthesis (and thus carbon uptake). This 
should be born in mind when evaluating scientific estimates of vulnerabilities. For ex-
ample, in some sub-regions a decrease in precipitation may be offset by the direct effects 
of increased atmospheric carbon dioxide. 
It is hoped that the sketch of vulnerabilities provided here will provide a basis for an ex-
ploration of likely key vulnerabilities of regional systems in the HOT dialogue.  
4.7 Africa 
The IPCC TAR synthesis report (IPCC 2001) concludes that Africa should be considered 
as highly vulnerable to climate change. This conclusion was based upon the fact that: 1) 
a large part of the continent is dry sub-humid to arid, and the dominant impact of climate 
change is predicted to be a reduction in soil moisture in sub-humid zones and a reduction 
in runoff; 2) Africa will be especially vulnerable to climate change because of a number 
of current factors such as widespread poverty, recurrent droughts, inequitable land distri-
bution, and overdependence of rainfed agriculture. 
The TAR (IPCC 2001b, chapter 10) highlights six key areas of vulnerability to climate 
change for Africa: 
· Water resources, especially in international shared basins where there is a potential 
for conflict and a need for regional coordination in water management. 
· Food security at risk from declines in agricultural production and uncertain climate. 
· Natural resource productivity at risk and biodiversity that might be irreversibly lost. 
· Vector and Water-borne diseases, especially in areas with inadequate health infra-
structure. 
· Coastal zones vulnerable to sea-level rise, particularly roads, bridges, buildings, and 
other infrastructure that is exposed to flooding and other extreme events. 
· Exacerbation of desertification by changes in rainfall and intensified land use. 
Here we address water resources, food security and natural ecosystems in more detail. 
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4.7.1 Water Resources 
Water resources are a key area of vulnerability in Africa, affecting water supply for 
household use, agriculture, and industry. Trends in regional per capita water availability 
in Africa over the past half century show that water availability has diminished by an as-
tonishing 75% (IPCC 2001, p261). Although the past 2 decades have experienced reduc-
tions in river flows, especially in sub-Saharan West Africa, the trend mainly reflects the 
impact of population growth (population quadrupled in most countries during this pe-
riod). The continuation of existing multiple pressures on water resources combined with 
climate cha nge impacts is likely to accentuate water scarcity in most sub-humid regions 
of Africa. 
Key risks from climate change include: 
· Reduction in soil moisture in dry sub-humid zones leading to implications for both 
natural ecosystems and agriculture; Reduction in runoff, current trends indicate a de-
creasing runoff of some 17% over the past decade. 
· Shared river basins where there is a potential for conflict (and where regional coop-
eration protocols can minimize adverse impacts and potential for conflicts). 
· The gradual yet dramatic disappearance of glaciers on Mount Kilimanjaro is a result 
of a warming in recent decades (IPCC 2001b). Other glaciers in Africa are under a 
similar threat. 
4.7.2 Food Security 
There is a wide consensus that climate change, will worsen food security in Africa, 
mainly through increased extremes and temporal/spatial shifts (IPCC 2001b, Chapter 
10). Africa already experiences a major deficit in food production in many areas.  
Key risks from climate change include: 
· Potential declines in soil moisture adding to the existing food deficit burden. 
· Climate change induced water stress together with land degradation rendering inland 
fisheries more vulnerable to episodic drought and habitat destruction. 
· Ocean warming is likely to impact coastal marine fisheries. 
· Food importing countries will be vulnerable to the effects of impacts on agriculture 
elsewhere. 
4.7.3 Biodiversity and Natural Ecosystems 
The TAR concludes that, in Africa, irreversible losses of biodiversity could be accele r-
ated by climate change (IPCC 2001).  
Key risks from climate change include: 
· Vulnerability of biodiversity-rich biomes: Climate change leading to drastic shifts of 
biodiversity-rich biomes such as the Succulent Karoo in South Africa. In many cases 
natural (e.g. oceans) or man-made (e.g. settlements) barriers will greatly increase the 
threat to biodiversity as biomes are unable to shift to new areas. 
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· Vulnerability of natural ecosystems due to the impacts of climate change on fire re-
gimes: changes in fire regimes and habitat modification from land-use change may 
negate natural adaptive processes and lead to extinctions. 
· Climate change induced changes in ecosystems will affect water supply fuelwood 
and other services. 
4.8 Asia  
The TAR concludes that climate change will impose significant stress on resources 
throughout the Asian region (IPCC 2001, p263). It goes on to state that natural resources 
are already under stress in many areas, and the resilience of most sectors in Asia to cli-
mate change is poor. Many countries are socio -economically dependent on natural re-
sources such as water, forests, grassland and rangeland, and fisheries. The magnitude of 
change in climate variables would differ significantly across Asian sub-regions and 
countries. 
Major risks linked to change in climate and its variability over Asia identified in the TR 
include (IPCC 2001b, chapter 11): 
· The large deltas and coastal low-lying areas of Asia could be inundated by sea-level 
rise. 
· Many developing countries in Asia are already vulnerable to extreme climate events 
such as droughts and floods, and climate change could exacerbate these vulnerabili-
ties. 
· Increased precipitation intensity, particularly during the summer monsoon, could in-
crease flood-prone areas in temperate and tropical Asia. 
· There is also a potential for drier conditions in arid and semi-arid Asia during the 
summer, which could lead to more severe droughts. 
· Freshwater availability is expected to be highly vulnerable to climate change. 
· Tropical cyclones could become more intense. Combined with sea-level rise, this 
impact would result in enhanced risk of loss of life and properties in coastal low-
lying areas of cyclone prone countries of Asia. 
· Agriculture would be threatened by a combination of thermal and water stresses, sea-
level rise, increased flooding, and strong winds associated with tropical cyclones. 
· Warmer and wetter conditions would increase the potential for a higher incidence of 
heat-related and infectious diseases in tropical and temperate Asia. 
· Climate change would exacerbate threats to biodiversity resulting from land-
use/cover change and population pressure in Asia. 
Several risks associated specifically with boreal Asia were also identified: 
· Permafrost degradation due to climate change would increase the vulnerability of 
many climate-dependent sectors affecting the economy in boreal Asia. 
· Surface runoff increases during spring and summer would be pronounced in Boreal 
Asia. 
· Frequency of forest fires is expected to increase in Boreal Asia. 
Here we address water resources, food security and natural ecosystems in more detail. 
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4.8.1 Water Resources 
Freshwater availability is expected to be highly vulnerable to climate change (IPCC 
2001, p265). 
Key risks from climate change include: 
· Vulnerability of freshwater supplies: Growing populations and concentrations of 
popula tion in urban areas will exert increasing pressures on water availability and 
water quality.  
· The TAR suggests that water could become a scarce commodity in many south and 
southeast Asian countries, particularly where reservoir facilities to store water for ir-
rigation are minimal. 
· Surface runoff is expected to decrease drastically in arid and semi-arid Asia. 
4.9 Food Security 
The TAR concludes that food security appears to be the primary concern for Asia. Crop 
production and aquaculture would be threatened by thermal and water stresses, sea-level 
rise, increased flooding, and strong winds associated with intense tropical cyclones 
(IPCC 2001, p265). In general it is expected that areas in mid- and high latitudes will 
experience increases in crop yields; yields in lower latitudes will generally decrease. 
Climatic variability and change will also affect both the timing and duration of the crop-
ping season.  
Key risks from climate change include: 
· In China yields of several major crops are expected to decline as a result of climate 
change. 
· Acute water shortages combined with thermal stress could adversely affect wheat, 
and more severely, rice productivity in India (even under the positive affects of fu-
ture elevated carbon dioxide levels). 
· Crop diseases such as wheat scab, rice blast, and sheath and culm blight of rice could 
become more widespread in temperate and tropical regions of Asia if the climate be-
comes warmer and wetter. 
· Multiple threats to aquaculture as wild stocks that are already under stress as a result 
of over exploitation are further stressed by the effects of climate change (such as ma-
rine productivity being impacted by plankton shifts resulting from temperature 
changes). 
4.9.1 Biodiversity and Natural Ecosystems 
The TAR concludes that climate change would exacerbate current threats to biodiversity 
resulting from land-use/cover change and population pressure in Asia (IPCC 2001, 
p265). The TAR found that risks to species are increasing, with for example as many as 
1,250 of 15,000 higher plant species under threat in India (and similar trends being evi-
dent in China, Mala ysia, Myanmar, and Thailand). 
Key risks from climate change include: 
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· Many species are likely to be exterminated as a result of the synergistic effects of cli-
mate change and habitat fragmentation. 
· In Asia’s desert ecosystems increased frequency of droughts may result in a decline 
in local forage around oases, causing mass mortality among local fauna and threate n-
ing their existence. 
· Mangrove ecosystems will be severely threatened by sea-level rises. 
· The frequency of forest fires is expected to increase in boreal Asia. 
4.10 Latin America 
In many sub-regions of Latin America, current variability in climate is associated with 
phenomena that already produce impacts with important socio-economic and environ-
mental consequences; and the TAR concludes that these consequences could be exacer-
bated by global warming and its associated weather and climate changes (IPCC 2001, 
p271). ENSO is currently responsible for a large part of the climate variability at inter-
annual scales in Latin America. The region is vulnerable to El Nino, with impacts vary-
ing across the continent.  
4.10.1 Water Resources 
The TAR highlights the fact that few specific water resource impact studies using cli-
mate change scenarios have been conducted in Latin America.  
Key risks from climate change include: 
· In some Latin American areas it is likely that climate change would substantially 
change the availability of fresh water. Watersheds in arid and semi-arid regions are 
especially vulnerable. 
· It has been well established that glaciers in Latin America have receded in the past 
several decades (IPCC 2001, p272). Continued warming in high mountain regions 
could lead to disappearance of significant snow and ice surface. Because there areas 
contribute to river streamflow, this trend would also reduce water available for irriga-
tion and hydropower generation. 
4.10.2 Food Security 
The TAR concludes that for many sub-regions of Latin America climate change will 
likely result in overall decreased crop yields (IPCC 2001, p272). It finds, in particular 
that subsistence farming could be severely threatened in some parts of Latin America, 
including northeastern Brazil, with implications for some of the poorest and most vul-
nerable sectors of the population. 
Key risks from climate change include: 
· Many Latin American economies rely on production from small farming systems, 
and these could be severely influenced by climate change. 
· Extremes in climate variability (e.g. Southern Oscillation) already severely affects 
agriculture in Latin America. In southeastern South America, maize and soybean 
yields tend to be higher during the warm Southern Oscillation and lower during the 
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cold phase (IPCC 2001b, p714). Climate Change would be added to this background 
variability and could aggravate losses caused by extreme events. 
· Land-use choices will be affected by climate change. For example, increasing pre-
cipitation in marginal areas could lead to an increase in cropped lands. This could 
have a positive effect, though in combination with other drivers (such as the contin-
ued trend to replace subsistence with market crops) there might result increasing 
threats to soil sustainability leading to enhanced vulnerability to climate change. 
· Ranching is a major land use in many parts of Latin America. In areas subject to pro-
longed droughts, such as northeastern Brazil and many rangeland areas in Mexico, 
production would be negatively affected by increased variability of precipitation 
from climate change. In the case of cattle in central Amazonia, higher peak flood 
stages could increase losses to cattle kept on platforms (marombas) during the high-
water period. 
· Plantation forestry is a major land use in Brazil and is expected to expand substa n-
tially over coming decades (IPCC 2001a, p715). Climate change can be expected to 
reduce silvicultural yields in sub-regions where the climate becomes drier. 
4.10.3 Biodiversity and Natural Ecosystems 
The TAR concludes that it is well established that Latin America accounts for one of the 
Earth’s largest concentrations of biodiversity, and the impacts of climate change can be 
expected to increase the risk of biodiversity loss (IPCC 2001, p272). 
Key risks from climate change include: 
· The remaining Amazonian forest is threatened by the combination of human distur-
bance, increases in fire frequency and scale and decreased precipitation from 
evapotranspiration loss, climate change and El Nino. 
· Neo-tropical seasonally dry forest could be severely threatened by increased te m-
perature and decreased precipitation resulting from climate change. 
· Tree mortality increases at the newly formed edges of Amazonian forests - due to 
drier conditions. Such edges would be especially susceptible to the effects of de-
creased precipitation. 
· Climate Change could expand the area potentially suitable for tropical forest as equi-
librium vegetation types. However, the forces driving deforestation make it unlikely 
that such potential increases in area will be realised. 
· Sea-level rise will affect mangrove ecosystems by eliminating their present habitats 
and creating new tidally inundated areas to which some mangrove species may shift. 
4.11 Sample Annex I region: Europe 
The TAR concludes that there is a very high confidence that climate change will aggra-
vate the vulnerability of natural, social and economic systems in Europe (IPCC 2001, 
p270). Vulnerability to climate change in Europe differs substantially between subre-
gions. Southern Europe and the European Artic are more vulnerable than other parts of 
Europe. 
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4.11.1 Water Resources 
The TAR concludes that water resources and their management in Europe are under 
pressure now, and that these pressures are likely to be exacerbated by climate change. 
Climate change is likely to widen water resources differences between northern and 
southern Europe. 
Key risks from climate change include: 
· Flood hazard is likely to increase across much of Europe. 
· Risk of water shortages is likely to increase. 
· Europe’s Alpine glaciers will be severely affected by climate change. 
4.11.2 Food Security 
The TAR concludes that in Europe agricultural yields for most crops will increase as a 
result of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. However, this increase in 
yields will be counteracted by the risk of water shortage in southern and eastern Europe 
and by shortening of the duration of growth in many crops (due to increasing tempera-
ture). Northern Europe is likely to experience overall positive effects, whereas some ag-
ricultural production systems in southern Europe may be threatened. 
Key risks from climate change include: 
· Increased risk of water shortage in southern Europe. 
· Increases in timber harvests in Northern Europe and reductions in the Mediterranean 
region, with increased drought and fire risk. 
4.11.3 Biodiversity and Natural Ecosystems 
The TAR concludes that natural ecosystems will change primarily as a result of increas-
ing temperature and atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. 
Key risks from climate change include: 
· Permafrost will decline and trees and shrubs will encroach into current northern tun-
dra. 
· Broad-leaved trees may encroach into current coniferous areas. 
· Net primary productivity is likely to increase (as a result of nitrogen deposition), but 
increases in decomposition (from increasing temperature) may negate any additional 
carbon storage. 
· Diversity in nature reserves is under threat from rapid change. 
· Loss of important habitats (wetland, tundra, and isolated habitats) would threaten 
some species 
· Soil properties would deteriorate under warmer and drier climates in southern 
Europe. 
· In mountain regions, higher temperatures would lead to an upward shift in biotic 
zones, posing a threat to some species. 
· Timber harvests may increase in commercial forests in northern Europe, although 
forest pests and disease may increase. 
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4.12 Indicators, thresholds and the role of adaptation 
The previous section has provided a sketch of some of the likely regional vulnerabilities 
to climate change. The next step in exploring dangerous climate change is to select spe-
cific indicators of vulnerability to climate change and to assess what would be the limit 
of an acceptable magnit ude of the indicator.  
One possible useful outcome of the HOT dialogue is to explore and generate ideas for 
suitable indicators of dangerous climate change; and to explore, and, where possible, 
identify values for thresholds that represent the limits to acceptable levels of impact in a 
particular impact category. The aim of this section is thus not to give a comprehensive 
overview of indicators, but rather to provide a framing for such an activity. Within the 
first phase of the HOT project we would propose the development of indicators along the 
lines of the following table:  
 
Sector Indicator Threshold Temporal/ 
Spatial Scale 
Adaptation 
Potentials 
Water Resources  Irrigation de-
mand  
50% of annual 
seasonal water 
usage 
Irrigated area Switch to crops 
with less water 
demand 
     
Food Security 
/Agriculture 
 
Productivity of a 
specific crop 
Decrease below 
a threshold X 
Sub-regional Switch to crop 
more suited to 
new climate 
     
Biodiversity/ 
Ecosystems 
Rate of biome 
migration 
Maximum rate 
of biome migra-
tion 
Regional Managed migra-
tion of tree spe-
cies 
 Loss of coral 
reef systems 
Loss of X% of 
coral reef biodi-
versity 
Global None/ Managed 
migration of 
reefs 
     
 
A representative set of examples of indicators was given in the box in section 3. Here 
these examples have been used (with some additional examples) to fill in some sample 
entries to the table. The entries are provided simply as examples and it is suggested that 
the HOT dialogue itself might further explore suitable indicators and threshold values on 
a regional basis. 
4.13 The role of adaptation 
Ultimately the realised impacts of any climate change depend crucially on adaptation: 
“Successful adaptation reduces vulnerability to an extent that depends greatly on ada p-
tive capacity – the ability of an affected system, region, or community to cope with the 
impacts and risks of climate change. Enhancement of adaptive capacity can reduce vul-
nerability and promote sustainable development across many dimensions” (IPCC 2001b, 
p918). 
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Throughout evolutionary history, natural and human systems have adapted to spatial and 
temporal variations in climate. Many social and economic systems – including agricul-
ture, forestry, settlements, industry, transportation, human health and water resource 
management – have evolved to accommodate deviations from “normal” climatic condi-
tions, although fewer examples exist of such systems successfully accommodating the 
extremes of weather. This capacity of systems to accommodate variations in climatic 
conditions from year to year is referred to as the coping range or resilience.  
The ability of individuals and social institutions to adapt to, and cope with, climate 
change is a function of wealth, technology, information, skills, infrastructure, instit u-
tions, equity, empowerment and the ability to spread risk. Individuals and institutions 
with adaptive capacity that is limited by any of these factors are more vulnerable to cli-
mate change than those who have no such limitations, just as they are also more vulner-
able to other stresses. Adaptive capacity in natural systems tends to be more limited than 
adaptive capacity in human systems. For example, many species have limited ability to 
migrate or to change behaviour in response to climate change. 
Adaptive measures are likely to be necessary to enhance the resilience of the ecological 
and socio-economic systems to projected and actual changes in climate. Adaptation to 
climate change can take many forms. These include actions taken by people with the in-
tent of lessening impacts or utilizing new opportunities, and structural and functional 
changes in natural systems made in response to changes in pressures. In terms of ada p-
tive actions taken by human societies, the range of options includes reactive adaptations 
(actions taken in response to changing conditions and without prior preparation) and 
planned adaptations (actions taken either in response to, or in anticipation of, changing 
conditions and with advance preparation). Adaptations can be taken by private entities 
(e.g. households or business firms) or by public entities (e.g. local, state or national gov-
ernment agencies).  
Numerous adaptation options for responding to climate change have the potential to re-
duce adverse, and enhance beneficial, impacts of climate change. Yet these options will 
usually incur cost. This reveals a major challenge for policy makers: how do they plan 
these (costly) adaptive strategies against a threat that although likely to occur, is highly 
uncertain in the precise way that it will manifest itself? The problem is particularly acute 
for developing countries. Many developing nations are vulnerable to current climate 
hazards.25 Most have highly variable climates and all are limited in their capacity to 
adapt to changes in the extremes of weather. Despite contributing little to historical 
greenhouse gas emissions, deve loping countries are nevertheless highly vulnerable to the 
impacts of projected climate change.26 Adaptation to climate change is a development is-
sue that competes for resources (or creates synergies) with other development issues, 
such as food security, social equity, education and health.27 
The starting point for adaptation decisions is to identify the assets or functions at risk and 
to explore the possible range of impacts to which one would need to adapt. This la tter ac-
tivity is a complex task because it involves understanding regional patterns of climate 
change, the evolution of key socio -economic and biophysical components of the sector 
or region under consideration, and the dynamics of the impacts of changing climatic 
conditions on the evolving social system.  
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As the IPCC concluded in its latest Assessment Report, global-average temperature is 
projected to increase by 1.4°C to 5.8oC between 1990 and 2100. No likelihoods were at-
tached to this range, neither was any distribution specified within this range. This creates 
difficulties for policymakers in prioritizing adaptation options: if all outcomes within the 
projected range are equally likely, all adaptation measures to address the corresponding 
climate change impacts should be considered equally necessary.  
There have been attempts, however, within the research community to confront this limi-
tation by estimating future climate risks and by prioritizing adaptation without first hav-
ing to predict the “most likely” climate change.28 This could be achieved by taking a 
risk-based approach. By identifying the triggers, or critical thresholds, which signal a 
state of vulnerability, it is possible to determine where this threshold is located within a 
range of future climate uncertainties and how likely it is the threshold will be breached. 
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5. Comparative Analysis of the Workshops: An Inventory 
of the Results 
5.1 Introduction 
In the first phase of the project, national and regional workshops were organized in dif-
ferent parts of the world. In accordance with the research protocol, surveys were sent out 
to stakeholders to inventarize perceptions of Article 2 of the UNFCCC. The methodol-
ogy for the workshop also asked participants and other stakeholders to write their views 
on a few questions sent to them by the project team. These completed questio nnaires 
were then analysed and presented at the workshops. Finally, an informal assessment 
meeting of the project partners was held in Potsdam to discuss the way forward. 
5.1.1 The pre-workshop surveys and their substantive results 
TERI in New Delhi prepared the initial questions for the questionnaire that were then 
used by most of the partners. The questions they highlighted included: 
· Is Article 2 adequately formulated? 
· When are Article 2 conditions no longer met? 
· At what scale should Article 2 conditions be assessed?  
· Are the three conditions equally important? 
· What scientific information is most needed? 
· What outcomes of climate change policies are unacceptable? 
· How should mitigation and adaptation costs be mitigated? 
· What controversies are to be expected? 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to communicate the nature of the problem to a 
wide group of stakeholders and to promote their engagement in the discussion, to de-
velop input for the workshops and to identify needs that could be then used to structure 
the workshop and to check if the workshop views are representative of the wider stake-
holder community.  
5.1.2 Response levels 
The Brazilian project team sent out 700 questionnaires but received only 13 answers. 
The Asian survey was sent to 200 stakeholders and 27 responses were elicited. 14 re-
sponses were from South Asia, 10 from South-East Asia, 2 from the former Soviet Un-
ion countries and 1 from West Asia. Classified in terms of stakeholders, 6 responses 
were received from government, 8 from scientists, 10 from NGOs, 2 from international 
organizations and 1 from business. The African survey was sent to about 100 respon-
dents and 20 responses were received, most of which were from NGOs and research cen-
tres and 8 from policy makers and negotiators, some from IPCC scientists. In terms of 
geographical representation half of the responses were from West Africa. The Annex I 
questionnaire was sent to 300 stakeholders of whom 38 responded. The responses were 
mostly from scientists (17), policymakers (15), NGOs (5) and business (1). Most re-
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sponses came from Europe (19), America (8), other OECD (7), Central Europe (1) and 
International Organisations (3). 
Although the questionnaires have been organized at national (Brazilian), continental (Af-
rican and Asian) and cross-continental levels (Annex I), a similar cross-section of ideas 
were reflected in different parts of the world. The response to the questionnaires was 
about 10% which is approximately the normal response rate for such types of inquiries. 
People only respond when they are somehow stimulated by the subject and feel that their 
opinion counts. However, it appears that, particularly in developing regions, people were 
afraid to respond because they did not have a good understanding of the climate change 
issues and had actually never given much thought to Article 2, even though they were 
engaged in the climate change discussions in one way or another. A request to simplify 
the questionnaire as a means to gauge responses was made.  
5.1.3 The Workshops 
Four workshops were held in different parts of the world as shown in the table below. 
 TERI ENDA COPPE OECD 
Date regional 
meeting 
30 June, 1 July. 27 - 28 June 14 May 2-3 June 
Venue regional 
meeting 
Bangalore  Accra Rio de Janeiro Amsterdam 
Procedural chair Kok Kee Chow 
(Malaysia) or 
Shekhar Das-
gupta (India) 
Dr. Papa Cham 
(Gambia) and 
Dr. Peter Yerima 
Tarfa (Nigeria) 
Dr. Fabio 
Feldmann 
Dr. Joyeeta 
Gupta 
Substantive chair Mohan Mun-
asinghe (Sri 
Lanka) or Tsu-
neyuki Morita 
(Japan) 
Jean Philipe 
Thomas  
Dr. Fabio 
Feldmann (with 
technical support 
COPPE) 
Dr. Bert Metz 
Logistical coor-
dinator 
Poonam Sahai 
and Tanushree 
Sinha 
Djimingue 
Nanasta 
André Simões 
and Carolina 
Dubeux 
Marcel Berk and 
Wietske van den 
Bovenkamp 
 
The Brazilian workshop was attended by 23 stakeholders five of which were scientists, 
seven researchers and three representatives from companies, three from government and 
three from NGOs. The Indian workshop was attended by 21 participants, the African 
workshop was attended by about 30 stakeholders, while the OECD workshop had … 
participants. 
The Workshops shared some common material: 
· Common introduction to the science-policy communication challenge ; 
· Common background scientific papers; 
· Common rules of procedure; 
Although the written material was common, the interpretation was given a regional twist 
and regional experts presented their interpretation of the documents provided.  
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The workshops began with a discussion of the results of the questionnaires that had been 
sent out. At the workshops, the focus was on dialogue, not monologue or negotiation, lis-
tening not sermonising, equality of views and opinions, inclusion not exclusion, confi-
dentiality and anonymity, mutual understanding and optimism. The meetings had sub-
stantive and pr ocedural chairs to promote the discussion. For details see the Appendixes 
on the regional reports. All the meetings invested in ensuring that there was a common 
understanding of the problem and then set out to discuss the critical issues.  
The following section presents an integrated cross-cutting analysis focusing on a number 
of issues arising from the following issues arising from both the questionnaires and the 
workshops: 
5.2 The Practicability of Article 2 
In general many stakeholders feel that it is difficult to define dangerous anthropogenic 
interference because it is not practical, it is scientifically arbitrary and because there is no 
universally accepted notion of the concept of ecosystems sustainability or because it in-
volves first defining a desired state of economic development. 
While a minority of respondents felt that Article 2 gave sufficient guidelines about how 
the long-term objective of the climate change regime should be articulated, many felt 
that in the articulation process attention must be paid to the following clusters of issues: 
· The need to clarify what sustainable development15 implies perhaps  leading to ar-
ticulation of alternative forms of development, the need to focus on poverty allevia-
tion16, and the need to clarify the rela tionship with sustained economic growth17; 
· The desire to focus on stabilizing temperature increase rather than GHG concentra-
tions,18 
· The question whether natural adaptation is desirable and instead the focus could per-
haps be on ecosystem health or maintenance;19 
· The question whether natural adaptation exclude human help for such adaptation,20 
· The question of how equity is to be interpreted within this article; 21 
· The need to quantify the goals;22 
· The need to include health related issues,23 species conservation,24 changes in land 
use patterns, water management and carrying capacity25; threat to human life due to 
sea level rise and extreme events, 26 access to energy, 27 
                                                 
15 Brazilian questionnaires; but this point is also reflected in the answers given to other questions 
in the other regional questionnaires. 
16 Asian questionnaire. 
17 Annex I questionnaire. 
18 Annex I questionnaire. 
19 Brazilian and Asian questionnaire. 
20 Annex I questionnaire. 
21 Brazilian questionnaire. 
22 Brazilian questionnaire. 
23 Brazilian, Asian and Annex I questionnaire. 
24 Brazilian questionnaire. 
25 Asian questionnaire. 
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· The need to include the rate of change, irreversible impacts, distributional and scale 
aspects,28 
· The need to incorporate socio-economic factors, human aspects, which all define the 
vulnerability of the people and their ability to adapt to the changing climate,29 
· The need to incorporate the magnitude and direction of the policy efforts required to 
deal with the problem,30  
· The need to develop monitoring instruments such as systematic observation net-
works, ecosystem and poverty monitoring systems,31 
· The need to include safeguards for countries at risk from inundation,32  
· The need to interpret Article 2 in relation to national priorities,33 and 
· The need to focus on vulnerability thresholds and indicators of individual, social and 
economic development; and the need to focus on risk and individual perceptions of 
danger. 34 
5.3 When Article 2 conditions are no longer met 
The responses to the questionnaires and workshops indicate that there are a number of 
situations in which some stakeholders feel that the conditions in Article 2 are no longer 
met, i.e. that we are facing dangerous anthropogenic interference levels: 
· Already, since irreversible damage is already taking place, 35 
· When the temperature increases more than 2 degrees, 36 
· When there is disruption of the west-Antarctic ice sheet, melting of Greenland, 
change in ocean currents, modification of regional weather systems (e.g. rain sea-
sons),37 
· When there are severe problems such as the 2002 drought in India, modification of 
ENSO patterns, floods, droughts and famines; 38 
· When irreversible damage has occurred to sensitive ecosystems;39 
· When poverty is exacerbated,40 and or when communities are unable to cope with lo-
cal climate change,41 
· when island states survival is affected, 42 
                                                                                                                                          
26 Asian questionnaire. 
27 Asian questionnaire. 
28 Annex I questionnaire. 
29 African questionnaire. 
30 Brazilian questionnaire. 
31 African questionnaire. 
32 Brazilian questionnaire. 
33 Asian Workshop. 
34 Asian questionnaire. 
35 Annex I questionnaire. 
36 Annex I questionnaire. 
37 Annex I questionnaire. 
38 Response to Asian questionnaires. 
39 Response to Asian, African and Annex I questionnaires. 
40 Response to Asian questionnaires. 
41 Response to Asian and African questionnaires. 
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· when food production or economic development is affected,43 
· when local health is badly affected, 44 
· when unbalanced economic development vis a vis environmental conservation and 
social sustainability occurs, 45 
· when there is lack of proactive environmental policy at international level,46 and 
· when there is a lack of compliance with international commitments and if efforts to 
limit GHG emissions fail. 47 
Stakeholders felt that it was necessary to develop indicators on when dangerous thresh-
olds have been exceeded. Some stakeholders outlined the possible negative impacts of 
low concentration levels. Some asked what would happen if the concentration level 
reached 1000 ppm (see Table). 
Concentration level Possible dangerous impact 
450 ppm 2 degree Celsius above pre-industrial levels; 
sea-level rises beyond 1 metre 
550 ppm Greenland ice sheet melts, ecosystems will disappear, some coun-
tries will disappear. 
650  
1000 ppm ?? 
5.4 At what scale should Article 2 be interpreted? 
The bulk of the respondents felt that Article 2 needed to be interpreted on the basis of in-
formation from local through to global levels, and if necessarily on a case by case basis 
and/or sectoral basis. Most respondents were convinced that since impacts will be felt at 
local and regional levels (i.e. ecological impacts but also impacts on economic activities) 
these levels had to be explicitly taken into account in any determination of what is dan-
gerous. It was also felt that equity would be a critical issue in the determination of 
scale.48  
Appropriate scale also dependent on types of risks (e.g. risks to ecosystems: local-
regional; risks to food production: regional-global; risks from disruption of climate sys-
tem / ocean currents: global).49 Too small scale makes it difficult to distinguish between 
change due to CC and other causes.50 Appropriate scales can be bio-geographical units 
(ecosystem) or socio-cultural units (e.g indigenous groups) rather than administrative 
units (like countries). 51 In relation to ecological issues, it is asserted that the appropriate 
scale is global, but the interpretation of this is that all ecosystems should be saved be-
                                                                                                                                          
42 Annex I questionnaire. 
43 Response to Asian and Annex I questionnaires. 
44 Annex I questionnaire. 
45 Response to Asian questionnaires. 
46 Response to African questionnaires. 
47 Response to African questionnaires. 
48 Response to African and Asian questionnaires. 
49Response to Annex I questionnaire. 
50 Response to Annex I questionnaire. 
51 Response to Annex I questionnaire. 
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cause everything is interconnected. The Brazilian workshop concluded: “it is politically 
absurd to say that a particular ecosystem can be eliminated”. 52  
Some felt that selected ecosystems and vulnerable groups should be identified as ele-
ments to focus on in relation to scale. 53 At the same time from a pragmatic perspective, 
it was also argued that countries are only interested in their national and local ecosys-
tems and so each country is likely to focus on its own local priorities. 54 
5.5 Are the three conditions equally important?  
The questionnaires and the works hops reveal that stakeholders face considerable diffi-
culty in identifying the nature of the relationship between economic development, food 
production and security and ecosystem protection. Some felt that ecosystems should be 
given priority because “ecosystem ada ptation is the base of the food chain and economic 
resources”;55 or because there are fewer adaptation options and there is greater irreversi-
bility. 56 A range of different prioritization is suggested by some respondents, while 
some believe that all three are equally important. The relationship between food produc-
tion and food security (probably at local level) was also emphasized. 57 For Africans, 
food came first. For the other regions some argued that ecosystems come first and some 
sustained economic development. Many felt that other aspects also need to be taken into 
account (see above). 
5.6 What scientific information is most needed? 
The questionnaires and workshops revealed that stakeholders felt that they needed in-
formation on the following research questions: 
· The relation between a Party’s emissions and effects;58 
· Scenarios on regional impacts; 59 
· New technologies that are compatible with low education levels and social institu-
tions in the developing countries; 60 
· Atmospheric carrying capacity; 61 
· Impacts on regional and local ecosystems; 62 
· Impact on human health, food, timber production, industrial development, sea level 
rise, desertification, sink behaviour of oceans, soil and deserts, quantific ation of gaps 
between natural and human-induced climate change;63 
                                                 
52 Brazilian Workshop. 
53 Response to African questionnaires. 
54 Brazilian Workshop and response to Annex I questionnaires. 
55 Responses to Asian questionnaire. 
56 Response to Annex I questionnaire. 
57 Responses to African and Annex I questionnaires. 
58 Responses to Brazilian questionnaire. 
59 Responses to Brazilian questionnaire. 
60 Responses to Brazilian questionnaire. 
61 Responses to Brazilian questionnaire. 
62 Responses to Brazilian, Asian and African questionnaire. 
63 Responses to Asian questionnaire. 
HOT programme 
 
49
49
· The development of statistics and indicators on what is dangerous;64 
· The definition of valid and workable indicators for assessing local/regional vulner-
ability and adaptive capacity,65 
· The definition of target-loads (e.g. % percent at high risk of X or Y; compare critical 
loads for acidification),66 
· An explanation of about levels of risks from climate change at the regional level in 
relation to various concentration stabilisation scenarios,67 
· About changes in risks from extreme events,68 
· On critical thresholds for irreversible systems change,69 
· About the climate change risks and value of losses in ecosystem functions,70 
· About the “real” socio-economic costs of significant  reductions of GHGs (not just 
economic modelling) ,71 
· Methodologies to factor out (anthropogenic) CC stress component of impacted cate-
gories (e.g. food production) ,72 
· More social science research (e.g. on risk perceptions and social tolerances, impacts 
on cultures),73 
· Integrated inverse impacts analysis (from critical stress levels to likelihood of ex-
ceeding these for various emission levels (including subjective assessment                  
of levels of confidence) ,74 
· Better understanding of vulnerability/ danger 
· Indices of local and regional vulnerabiliy and adaptive capacity 
· Various response measures for adaptation to climate change  
· rate and level of desertification, deforestation and drought 
· Methods to quantify internal perceptions of danger and determine critical 
thresholds of social, physical and ecological risks of climate change 
· Approaches to assess risks in holistic manner under scientific uncertainty (in-
tegrated vulnerability and impact assessments of multiple risks), 75 and 
· The development of an integrated approach for collection and assessment of informa-
tion. 76  
                                                 
64 Responses to Brazilian questionnaire. 
65 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
66 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
67 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
68 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
69 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
70 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
71 Responses to Annex I ques tionnaire. 
72 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
73 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
74 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
75 Responses to Asian and African questionnaire. 
76 Responses to African questionnaire. 
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5.7 What outcomes of climate change policies are unacceptable? 
The stakeholders indicated that  three types of outcomes that are considered as unaccept-
able to the developing countries: 
· adverse environmental outcomes such as increase in famines, natural disasters, dis-
turbances to global/regional climate patterns, depopulation of small islands and the 
rise of environmental refugees and the relegation of adaptation as a secondary is-
sue;77 
· adverse policy outcomes for developing countries such as binding commitments that 
compromise the right to development, economically unfeasible implementation time 
frames, inequitable distribution of costs, inappropriate technology transfer, and other 
negative impacts on the domestic economy, no significant emission reductions by 
developed countries, main polluters not participating in taking action, increasing 
North South welfare gap and poverty in developing countries, policies that do not al-
locate costs and benefits in an equitable manner, policies that do not take national 
circumstances into account, policies ignoring the risk of high impact - low probabil-
ity events, policies discouraging/impairing economic growth and putting a unreason-
able burden on civil society, policies leaving future generation with unmanageable 
risks and costs78 
· adverse policy outcomes for all countries which would allow unsustainable energy 
use, unplanned industrialization and fuel-wood consumption, excessively high per 
capita emissions, high carbon intensity of GDP;79 
There was also fear about the monetization of social and cultural aspects and the exces-
sive use of economic instruments.  
5.8 How should adaptation and mitigation costs be distributed? 
The developing country respondents focused on the need to further articulate the polluter 
pays principle and the common but differentiated responsibility principle in the Climate 
Change Convention. 80 In addition some mentioned the need to take historical emissions 
into account, 81 the need to somehow account for population (per capita principle)  and 
population growth, capacity of countries and that there should be a mechanism for the 
distribution of benefits.82 It was also emphasized by some that any mechanism developed 
should ensure that adaptation costs should be borne by the biggest polluters while others 
stated that adaptation should be covered by national governments with some help fropm 
outside.83 Resources should be equally distributed between mitigation and adaptation. 84 
                                                 
77 Responses to Asian, African and Annex I questionnaire. 
78 Responses to Asian, African and Annex I questionnaires; Asian Workshop. 
79 Responses to Asian questionnaire, Asian Workshop. 
80 Responses to Brazilian, African, Asian and Annex I questionnaires and all the Southern Work-
shops. 
81 Responses to Brazilian and Asian questionnaires. 
82 Responses to Asian questionnaire. 
83 Responses to the Annex I questionnaire. 
84 Responses to African questionnaire. 
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Currently the adaptation funds have few resources.85 Ultimately there should be contrac-
tion and convergence.86 
5.9 What controversies are to be expected? 
The stakeholders expect a number of controversies. These include: 
· The definition of sustainable development;87 
· The articulation of  principles by which Parties assume responsibility for climate 
change; 88 
· The articulation of a developme nt approach which allows for growth but not at the 
cost of increasing emissions; 89 
· The conflict between market versus command and control instruments; 90 
· The problem of asymmetrical impacts,91 
· The conflict between efficiency and equity; 92 
· Holistic versus reductionist interpretations;93 
· The impact of sovereignty; 94 
· The question of imported versus endogenous technology; 95 
· The question of increased food production versus biodiversity96 
· On adaptation and mitigation costs;97 
· The question of which ecosystem to priorit ise since different ecosystems have differ-
ent resilience levels;98 
· The question of how to deal with scientific uncertainty and access to unbiased as-
sessment, transparency and information exchange; 99 
· The reliability of the inventories and developing baselines for GHG levels 100 
· The conflict between long-term and short-term views101 
· Conflicts with other MEAs;102 
· Adequacy of Annex I commitments;103 
                                                 
85 African Workshop. 
86 Response to the African questionnaires. 
87 Responses to Brazilian and Asian questionnaire. 
88 Responses to Brazilian questionnaire. 
89 Responses to Brazilian and Asian questionnaire. 
90 Responses to Brazilian questionnaire. 
91 Annex I workshop 
92 Responses to Brazilian questionnaire. 
93 African Workshop. 
94 Responses to Brazilian questionnaire. 
95 Responses to Brazilian questionnaire. 
96 Responses to Brazilian, Asian and Annex I questionnaire. 
97 Responses to African questionnaire. 
98 Responses to Asian questionnaire. 
99 Responses to Asian questionnaire. 
100 Responses to Asian and African questionnaires. 
101 Responses to Asian questionnaire. 
102 Responses to Asian questionnaire. 
103 Responses to Asian and African questionnaire. 
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· The development of commitments for non-Annex I countries;104 
· The question of who should pay?  105 
· The question of power politics and ideological issues, 106 
· Differences about proper scale of assessing “dangerous interference”, 107 
· Valuation of non-monetary impacts (ecosystems, culture) versus monetary impacts, 
108 
· Lack of consensus on Sustainable Development concept and its priorities (food ver-
sus nature), 109 
· Differences about dealing with risks / scientific uncertainty (e.g. attribution of nega-
tive changes to (anthropogenic) climate change), 110 
· Differences about feasible and acceptable levels of adaptation and mitigation, 111 and 
· Differences in interests between countries in mitigating CC. 112 
5.9.1 The Development of Sustainability Indicators. 
The following table provides a list of sustainability indicators developed by the partic i-
pants during the workshops as a first step towards defining what is dangerous. This table 
inventorises the views, but does not reflect a consensus. It is also far from complete. 
Sector Indicator Limit Spatial/Temporal 
scale 
Potential for Adapta-
tion 
Water Availability of drinking 
water 
Availability for hydro-
power plants 
Rainfall variation 
Average rainfall per  
region/concentration 
Pattern of Asian  
monsoons 
Net sea-level rise 
Amount of submerged 
land 
Frequency of flooding 
Change in summer run-
off 
Frequency of droughts 
Regional glacier loss 
Ice sheet stability 
In Brazil,  
Hydropower 
plants reservoirs 
are not allowed 
to have their 
storage  
capacities  
reduced by 20% 
Water table 
River basins 
Reservoir levels 
Optimisation of water 
use; 
Reducing the  
relevance of  
hydropower generation 
in e.g. Brazilian  
context 
Modernization of the 
supply & sanitation in-
frastructure 
                                                 
104 Responses to African questionnaire. 
105 Responses to Brazilian, Asian and African questionnaire. 
106 Responses to African questionnaire. 
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108 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
109 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
110 Responses to Annex I questionnaire. 
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Food 
safety/ 
agriculture 
Area suitable for agricul-
ture/inhabitation 
Tonnes of food pro-
duced/hectare 
Level of desertific ation 
Productivity of the rural 
zone 
 Regional and 
global 
Area suitable for 
agriculture 
 
Expansion of land  
reform by providing 
know-how to farmers; 
Redistribution of areas 
suitable for agriculture 
Crop rotation 
Equity in food distri-
bution 
Biodiver-
sity/Ecosy
stems 
No. of species 
Number of exotic and 
native species 
Stability of the  
ecosystem 
Loss of areas with high 
number of endemic spe-
cies 
Loss of charismatic  
flagship species (polar 
bear, etc.) 
Loss of keystone species 
Frequency of corral 
bleaching 
Mangroves 
Mountain ecosystems 
Water scarcity/aridity 
Sea level rise 
At the limit, spe-
cies must have 
preserved their 
migratory ca-
pacities 
The number of 
exotic species 
cannot be greater 
than the number 
of native spe-
cies; 
Threat of extinc-
tion of a biome 
Regional and 
global 
Ecological  
economic zoning 
Species migration 
Re-adaptation and 
transposition of en-
dangered ecosystems 
 Disintegration of the 
Antarctic Ice sheet 
Permafrost thawing 
Weakening of the ther-
mohaline circulation 
Glacier retreat 
Extreme events 
Frequency of storms 
Frequency of surges 
Intensity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased fre-
quency/intensity 
People affected 
Economic loss 
Global level  
Health Direct 
Morbidity 
Mortality 
Indirect 
Risk exposure 
Environmental risk 
Establishing  
limits that fore-
see increases in 
health problems 
in e.g. Brazil is 
unacceptable 
Local, provin-
cial, national, re-
gional and global 
Education campaigns 
Identification of new 
vaccines and medic a-
tions 
Combatting vectors 
that transmit disease 
Improving basic sani-
tation infrastructure  
Socio-
economic  
Food security 
Food shortage 
Self-sufficiency 
Crop migration 
Environmental refugees 
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Crop productivity 
Loss of land due to  
sea-level rise 
Loss of community  
welfare 
Reduced development 
capacity 
Others Pests 
Ecosystem nutrient rates 
Habitat fragmentation/ 
ecosystem adaptability 
Rate of climate change 
Temperature 
   
     
 
The Annex I workshops concluded that in order to define an effective list of criteria, we 
would need to identify: 
· Criteria, as mentioned in the table above. 
· Indicators for measuring the criteria such as number of people seriously affected, in-
come effects and damage, impacts on HDI and the impacts on the built environment; 
· Criteria for determining the appropriateness of the criteria such as measurability, 
predictability, reliability, attributability, transparency, and public appeal, and 
· Threshold levels such as early warning levels, maximum acceptable levels and no-go 
levels. 
5.9.2 Clustering of Views 
The following section attempts an analysis of the different perspectives of the stake-
holders.  
There was general consensus among all the participants on the need to focus on Article 2 
since it is the basis for all future negotiations.113 This was especially important given that 
many negotiators tend to overlook the long-term goal because of short-term pressures.114 
There were those who felt that sustainable development is broad enough to cover all the 
concerns of the developing countries; while others felt that it was too vague and there-
fore would end up not covering anything.  115 
· This would imply that there is urgent need for a short one-page articulation of the re-
lationship between sustainable development and climate change concept so that there 
is a common starting point for the global dialogue. 
There were concerns that the way ecosystems were included it was unclear if all ecosys-
tems should be protected for themselves and whether the ecological servic es they pr o-
vide to humans was included. There was general consensus on, in any case, including the 
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latter concept in the articulation of this concept. 116 Maintaining all ecosystems may be a 
valuable goal but not feasible. 117 
· This would imply that there is ur gent need for a short one-page articulation of the 
ecosystem concept so that there is a common starting point for the global dialogue. 
There were concerns about whether food production or security was implied by Article 2 
and whether food production and security at global level is acceptable or whether re-
gional and local security are more critical issues. Another issue was whether technology 
can address this problem.  118  
There were conflicting views about the how the three issues – ecosystem, food and sus-
tainable development relate to each other in the Article 2 and while African prioritised 
food security, others were not sure which led to which outcome and if there was a linear 
relationship between the three.119 More information on the relationship between the three 
could perhaps help people make informed choices. 
In any case it was felt that the focus on sustainable development, ecosystems and food 
should also include human health120  
Further, while most felt that equity should be the guiding principle in interpreting the Ar-
ticle, one must also take cognisance of the political realities. 121 Thus while many felt the 
polluter pays principle should guide the negotiations, others felt that this would be an 
impossible item to negotiate. 122 
· This could imply that a separation needs to be made between what countries want, 
and how they actually negotiate it given the political context. Mixing the two ap-
proaches may be an unproductive way of dealing with the issues. Some clarification 
and discussion of this could possibly add to the next round of dialogues. 
There were concerns that the central challenge of poverty was not being adequately re-
solved in the discussions.123  
· This could imply the need to summarise whether a poverty mainstreaming approach 
in the climate change agenda could yield results (link up with the poverty and cli-
mate change discussions currently taking place). 
There was convergence in the developing country workshops on what was unacceptable 
outcomes of the negotiating process, but these views differed somewhat from the views 
of the stakeholders in the Annex I workshop. 
There was fear that impacts at national level would be the driving force for action and 
that this could be a major bottleneck in the process.  
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· However, this could be dealt with by listing key unacceptable impacts in each region 
and then seeing what concentration level these unacceptable impacts are correlated 
to. This might help to find common ground. 
Some critical issues are: if national priorities are to be given priority as developing coun-
tries want, then this could be a two-edged sword that allows the developed countries to 
also prioritise domestic issues. Is this what the developing countries want?  
Another issue was the discussion on sustainable development. On the one hand stake-
holders sought some clarification of this term and on the other hand, the African stake-
holders concluded that they did not want a check-list of what is sustainable. 
The Brazilian workshop revealed essentially two ideal typical types: The Counter-
realist124 or developing country realist who argues for a legal and fair solution to global 
problems based on the principle of polluter pays and the precautionary principle and the 
Realist who says that since this argument is unacceptable to the developed countries, a 
different approach should be adopted. The African dialogue concluded that there were 
five types of perspectives – the Doubting Thomas (how is it going to work), the Speedy 
Gonzales (what can we do to make it operational), the evaluator (how do we make the 
discussion relevant and effective), the pessimist (we are too far behind in any case to ad-
dress the problem and be sustainable), the optimist (we have already achieved so much!).  
5.10 Workshop and Project Evaluation 
5.10.1 The Workshop Evaluations 
The following section briefly sums up the evaluation of the workshops.  
The Brazilians evaluated their workshop very positively in terms of exchanging ideas, 
knowledge and personal viewpoints and learning from each other. They feel that they 
have now identified a team of committed people  who will be willing to work on this is-
sue for some time together to further articulate the key issues involved. However, indus-
try was inadequately represented in the group. Despite the absence of industry, there was 
a positive and constructive sphere which led to effective learning and brainstorming 
processes. In terms of process, all participants felt that were given a chance of communi-
cating their perspectives, and 80% felt that others were able to understand what they had 
said. 30% of the participants felt that their positions on some issues had shifted as a re-
sult of the discussions. All participants felt that they identified common ground with 
other actors which they had not anticipated. All participants felt that they had acquired 
new scientific infor mation and 50% of the participants said that they had also learnt a lot 
about health, politics and international power relations. 70% of the participants felt that 
consensus domestically was possible and at least existed in relation to information needs. 
60% of the participants anticipated major disagreement nationally and internationally on 
the issue of the distribution of costs. Only 10% of the participants felt that there was 
agreement regarding the issues on which there was disagreement. Two types of dis-
agreements emerged: the first is in relation to whether negative impacts on Brazilians are 
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acceptable or not (one group said no- the other group said look at the power politics); 
and the other was on the accuracy of new climate change models.125 
The Asian Workshop concluded that they had two days of rich dialogue and intensive 
debate. However, there was limited participation from the business sector and the policy 
making sector. The Workshop also focused on the need to develop sub-regional perspec-
tives given the vast differences within the Asian region. The Participants concluded that 
such a Dialogue process could contribute to further development of the controversial is-
sues that Article 2 raises. 
The African Workshop concluded that they needed to move the discussion further 
through communicating results to outsiders and through an e-dialogue. The results of the 
survey showed that participants are not well informed about what is available and that 
they learnt a lot through the process. The evaluation of the workshop revealed that most 
participants were able to express their views freely, some hoped that they had been un-
derstood by others, while one was quite sure that he was not understood by the others. 
Some participants changed their position because they received more information while 
others were not convinced because of the lack of clarity in the arguments and the need to 
repeat African positions even if they were rhetorical. The participants argued that factors 
that influenced a change of position included: 
· The realisation of the need to work together at national and international level, 
· The need to adapt development policies to match international commitments, 
· New and additional information, and 
· Arguments from other participants.  
During the process some parties realised that they had common grounds with others 
which they had not previously identified especially in relation to the relationship be-
tween climate change, commerce and security, and adaptation.  
The Annex I stakeholders were very positive about the content and structure of the dia-
logue. Most told that they had learned a lot through the dialogue process though their po-
sitions may not have changed. They recommended longer dialogue sessions, smaller 
breakout groups and a little more structure. 
5.10.2 The Future of HOT 
The Workshops recommended that the project continue on the next phase; that there was 
enough support for both the focus and the methodology adopted to justify such an out-
come.  
These suggestions have been elaborated in a detailed project proposal for Phase II. 
Some of the additional topics proposed for the next round were: 
· To discuss article 2 in further detail at the global round of negotiations since climate 
impacts will most likely hit developing countries much harder than the developed 
countries,126 
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· How to allocate the costs related to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and to 
the adaptation to climate change under the mantle of equity among nations; South-
South and North-South discussions? 127 
· Means of improving social and market acceptability for non-fossil technologies? 128 
· To create opportunities for discussing positions at a sub-regional level but possibly 
across continents, 129  
· The provision of answers to the questions raised in Phase 1,130 
· The impacts of trade on climate change,131   
· The relationship with WTO and other MEAs,132 
· National security, 133 
· Public health and population control, 134 
· Public opinion, 135 
· Urban and local issues and linkages with climate change, 136 
· The Brazilian proposal on burden sharing,137 
· Distribution of adaptation costs among developing countries, 138 
· Capacity building in DCs on science, assessment, policy analysis and negotiations, 
· Mobilization of local resources,139 
· How can DCs ensure sustainable development without slowing down their growth?  
140 
· Vulnerability of Africa – what is dangerous for Africa141 
· New mechanisms for promoting cooperation142 
· The role of justice in determining dangerous climate change risks,143 
· The possibilities of science to help define relevant and usable indicators,144 
· What levels of adaptation are feasible and acceptable,145 
· How risk theories can help in understanding Art.2,146 
· Appropriate ways to make Art. 2 more meaningful for discussing post-Kyoto poli-
cies,147 
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· How to involve all relevant stakeholders (incl.. indigenous peoples) ,148 and 
· How to account for regional differences in global dialogue. ,149 
·  
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Major conclusions 
At the end of the first phase of the HOT project, the project team concluded that they 
were satisfied with the outcomes of the first phase. Most participants in the process be-
came very stimulated by the complicated scientific and value dimension of Article 2 and 
the need to develop new instruments for communication at a global level on these com-
plex issues. Some of the key conclusions of the first phase are:  
The focus on Article 2 
There was general consensus on the need to focus on Article 2. It was agreed that politi-
cal agreement was possible in 1992 by keeping Article 2 unclear and open to interpreta-
tion; but any future steps will need a further articulation of this Article.150 This leads to 
the implication that any attempt at articulating Article 2 will be an extremely politically 
challenging task and that high quality regional preparation and global dialogue as a pre-
condition for negotiation are a must. In fact, the first phase of our dialogue reveals that 
most negotiators get so involved in the nitty gritty details of negotiating short term goals 
on the basis of narrow national interests, that they lose sight of the long-term objective 
and what it implies for national commitments. It is therefore necessary to look beyond 
shorter-term imperatives in order to address this objective and contribute towards a 
sound and equitable long-term solution to the challenge of climate change. 
Is climate change a serious problem? 
In all the de veloping country workshops, there appeared to be some doubts as to the se-
verity of the potential impacts of climate change for the worlds’developing countries and 
there was a strong request for scientific studies that would help predict the magnitude of 
the impact and its consequences.151 This was somewhat in sharp contrast with the Annex 
I workshop where there was little doubt that developing countries would be very hard 
hit.  The developed country questionnaires revealed that many felt that we were already 
experiencing dangerous climate change. 152 The impacts on developing countries were 
seen to be primarily in relation to small island countries and possibly desert regions, as 
well as in the hydrological systems and food security worldwide. 
Can environment and development be dichotomised? 
Many stakeholders in the developing countries onderline the need that these countries 
should focus on development and that environmental issues should be considered in this 
context. 153 Given the current status of the problem, the magnitude of the costs to reduce 
the concentration of GHG in the atmosphere to a safe level and the political difficulties 
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to implement the required measures, there will be need to count on technology in order 
to minimize the problem. The argument was that new technologies will substitute for 
some the functions of the environment. This leads to the question: Can developing coun-
tries afford to dichotomise ecosystem protection and development in the context of Arti-
cle 2? Further, can new technologies actually imply a reduced dependence on the envi-
ronment? How can climate change be mainstreamed? In the Asian dialogue, it was rec-
ognised that generating awareness among stakeholders about potential impacts and their 
roles is the route to influence decisionmakers since they are guided by public perception. 
Integrating climate change policy with the development framework was regarded as the 
key, as any society will define Article 2 in the context of its own sustainable develop-
ment priorities. 
The practicability of Article 2 
The discussions concluded that Article 2 could be helpful in defining climate policies, 
but needed to be further elaborated so that there is common understanding of: 
· What is not an acceptable outcome of Article 2; 
· When Article 2 conditions are no longer met; 
· Common starting points for discussion and elaboration on the key terms in the Arti-
cle and the appropriate scale for these terms; 
· Identifying information needs to help the articulation process. 
Controversies 
There was some divergence about how serious climate change is as a problem, how 
“dangerous” should be defined, how priorities should be set, the risk of reductionist in-
terpretations of Article 2 and that the fear that historic responsibilities would not be 
taken into account. The first step in dealing with the controversies is to name them and to 
see if we can develop a common conceptual document in relation to these controversies 
and then move the dialogue further from there.  
Finding common ground through local impacts 
The participants asked for information regarding how concentrations of GHGs affect 
ecosystems, how they impact on local human health and timber production, how they af-
fect desertification; what the roles of oceans, soils and deserts are as sinks of greenhouse 
gases; how much of the emissions are human induced; the development of indices of lo-
cal and regional vulnerability and adaptive capacity, various response measures for ada p-
tation, methods to determine thresholds for risks, and approaches to assess risks in a ho-
listic manner. If it is possible to identify local impacts that occur at the same concentra-
tion level – it may be possible to find common ground across regions. If both rich and 
poor countries believe that locally they have cause to concern, they may agree that GHG 
levels beyond a certain concentration are unacceptable. 
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Finding common ground through the development of Indicators 
There was general consensus that developing indicators for what could be dangerous is  
a useful way forward. There was also a need to create a procedure for defining indic a-
tors.154  Furthermore it was considered necessary at this stage to develop a set of criteria 
to prioritise the indicators. It was also considered useful to relate different levels at GHG 
to the set of indicators at the global and regional level. 
Finding common ground through understanding the importance of values 
and principles in international law and relations 
The major question that was raised in all the dialogues was how mitigation and adapta-
tion costs should be distributed among countries and what criteria should be used to do 
this. Several criteria were mentioned in the different dialogues and number of principles 
were put forward. The legal viability of these norms needs to be verified through legal 
and political science research.  
Social and scientific learning 
Most of the participants in the developing country workshops had a very little notion of 
what a discussion of Article 2 would involve. Many felt intimidated by the questions in 
the questionnaire and were afraid that they did not have enough knowledge to deal with 
them. However, by the end of the workshops, most felt that even if they had not changed 
their position, they had learnt considerably about the various dimensions of Article 2. 
But even in the OECD workshops , partic ipants felt that they had been exposed to a rich 
learning experience.  
Self-selection of participants 
In all the national, regional and cross continental workshops it has become more than 
apparent that some kinds of stakeholders are more willing to participate than others. 
Very few participants from business and industry responded positively to the invitations 
to participate. This indicates that either they do not see the determination of long-term 
goals as something they have any competence in, or simply because of lack of interest. 
This lack of interest could stem from the fact that the issues at stake in the dialogue are 
not considered to be directly relevant to the work of these stakeholders. The non partic i-
pation of these stakeholders also implied that only those who were either very interested 
or motivated in the issue participated. The question is: Is it a structural weakness of the 
approach that the groups turn out to be groups of like-minded people? On the other hand, 
there were enough differences of opinion in all the workshops to still make it worthwhile 
to continue the discussions. Yet, this is a structural weakness and the partners will have 
to devise ways to include uninterested stakeholders with large stakes to join the process.  
The dia logue will hopefully provide ideas and learning that, eventually, will influence 
the many parties who are not interested or are perhaps even hostile to climate change ne-
gotiations.  This in itself is a good justification to continue the dialogue cycle further 
since the more chance people have to gain and share information, the more likely it is 
that ideas will sink in and extend to a wider circle. It was also noted there were no in-
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digenous participants or participants who were not experts or professionally interested in 
climate change. This was a weakness that also needs to be addressed in order to 
strengthen the dialogue. 
6.2 Recommendations 
The major recommendations that flow out of this research are: 
Continuation of the dialogues 
There was general consensus on the need for national and regional workshops to help 
participants prepare for global workshops on this issue. Initially developing country par-
ticipants felt especially uncomfortable about discussing issues to which they had given 
little or any thought. Many now feel that they have a much better idea what the key is-
sues are and that they will be in a better position to enter into discussions at a global 
level, before reflecting again in regional groups. The dialogue, unlike a workshop, gave 
the participants an opportunity to focus on what they understand from the issues, to ide n-
tify the sort of information they need, and to articulate their underlying values.  
Provide assessments of impacts at regional level 
Much more detailed information should be made ava ilable to the developing country re-
spondents not so much on the effects on small island states, since this appears to be in-
ternalized, but on general environment and ecosystems of the larger countries in the 
world and how this can affect their economy. For example, according to an expert155  sta-
bilization at 370 pp, would already intensify El Niño  and lead to severe consequences 
for Latin America; something not reflected in the IPCC TAR reports. 
Initial information needs 
The following section is based on an analysis of the information needs arising from the 
questionnaires, the workshop discussions both directly and indirectly.  
The information needs can be classified into four categories: 
· Information needs on impacts 
· Anthropogenic contribution to climate change and a quantificationof gaps be-
tween natural and anthropogenic climate change; 156 
· Information on the correlation between GHG concentration levels and El 
Niño;157  
· Information on the relationship between development, food production and 
ecological resilience;  
· Information needs on regional and local health impacts; 158 
· Regional impacts on ecosystems, their vulnerability and their capacity to 
adapt;159 
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· Information on the impacts of sea level rise and desertification (see footnote 
8); 
· How can non-monetary indicators be developed, scientifically justified and 
defended in the international arena?; 
· Can a poverty mainstreaming approach be beneficial in interpreting Article 
2? 
· Information needs on new technologies 
· Can genetic engineering provide a solution to food shortage and how will this 
affect developing countries?160 
· Information needs on articulation of certain terms  
· Relationship between sustainable development and climate change; 161 
· Ecosystems to adapt naturally; 162 
· Development of models 
· Development of indicators and threshold levels; building on the ideas that 
emerged at the workshops; 
· Policy guidelines on how the information should be communicated to non-
scientists; 163 
· Policy guidelines on how to deal with scientific uncertainty and how to articulate 
the precautionary principle;164 
· Policy guideline on a process to develop indicators;165 
· Development of indicators on sustainable development (link up with the South-
South-North project on this subject). 166 
· Methods to quantify internal perceptions of danger and determine critical thresh-
olds of social, physical, and ecological risks from climate change (Asian Wor k-
shop). 
Need for value related research 
There was considerable discussion on the conflicts in values between countries and the 
role of values in international relations and law. There was dissatisfaction with the no-
tion that national interests alone determine how countries take responsibility for their ac-
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162 There was some discussion of what is natural adaptation?162 Ecosystems could possibly adapt 
in such a way that global food production is not disturbed but regional food and water pro-
duction is so badly affected that countries lose their basic food security. Did the concept of 
natural adaptation also take into account the issue of ecosystem services?  
For most workshop participants, maintenance of the ecosystem and its services was the vital fea-
ture since this would influence food production and economic well-being.162 
163 Brazilian Workshop. 
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tions. In many of the workshops, it was emphasized by some of the participants that eq-
uity principles in Article 3 should determine the way Article 2 is interpreted. This calls 
for more value related research in international law and politics. 
Procedural aspects 
· It was decided to continue with the pre-dialogue questionnaire process because this 
helped to involve and inform a larger group of social actors about the problem and to 
gain access to their views. However, in the following round, the questionnaire will be 
simplified and possibly include closed questions based on the information received. 
· It was also felt necessary to find ways to make the process more attractive to other 
parties such as industry and policy makers from different sectors so that they would 
also be willing to engage in the discussion and bring their perceptions to the discus-
sion. 
· Since in some of the workshops, people were torn between what they saw as fair and 
what they saw as negotiable and reasonable, possibly in the future rounds of the dia-
logue we should try and split the two notions and see if that yields ground for more 
cooperation. 
· It was decided to continue keeping the dialogues as distinct and separate from the 
negotiating process. 
· Stakeholders recommended long working sessions, smaller breakout groups and en-
hanced interaction into science. 
6.3 Initial follow-up steps 
As an initial follow-up step, the HOT programme team submitted a pre-proposal to 
MISTRA in Sweden and was short-listed for submitting a proposal. This proposal has 
been submitted to MISTRA and we are now awaiting the outcomes of that discussion.  
Another follow-up proposal has been submitted by some members of the HOT pr o-
gramme to the Dutch NRP programme to undertake a dialogue within the Netherlands. 
This proposal is also under discussion. 
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